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ABSTRACT 
Few fields of law impact as wide a swath of population as consumer 
protection law. Alaska adopted its consumer protection statute, the Unfair 
Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (UTPCPA), amid a national 
movement to strengthen consumer protection laws. The UTPCPA uses broad 
language to encompass a wide range of conduct. However, creative pleading 
and recent applications of the UTPCPA have expanded the law in ways that 
threaten Alaska businesses even in the absence of culpable conduct. This Note 
reviews the history of consumer protection, Alaska’s UTPCPA, and the 
incentives leading to an expanding application of the UTPCPA. The Note 
concludes by proposing potential legislative solutions to rein in abuse of the 
Act. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Few fields of law impact as wide a swath of population as 
consumer protection law. After all, modern societies and economies 
demand that virtually all citizens fulfill their wants and needs in the 
market. State consumer protection acts became popular in the 1960s and 
1970s after the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) proved unable to 
prevent or punish fraudulent or deceptive practices through national 
actions. Modeled after and encouraged by the FTC, these acts are often 
referred to as “Little FTC Acts.” Alaska’s Unfair Trade Practices and 
Consumer Protection Act1 (UTPCPA) has noble goals—to shield 
Alaskans from unfair and deceptive merchants and to promote the flow 
of trade. Like similar “Little FTC Acts” across the country, the UTPCPA 
is broadly worded to encompass a wide range of conduct and to evolve 
with the times. Broad language, however, can also result in inconsistent 
application of the law. This Note makes the case that decisions by 
Alaska courts over the past decade have distorted the meaning of the 
statute and have applied it in ways that harm small businesses and put 
Alaskan consumers at risk. In Part I, this Note begins by examining the 
history of consumer protection law from common law fraud to the FTC 
to the rise of “Little FTC Acts.” Part II introduces the features of the 
Alaska UTPCPA and compares it to other similar state statutes. Part III 
explores where things went wrong with the application of the UTPCPA, 
and finally, Part IV suggests how changing the Act could better serve 
the interests of both citizens and businesses. 
I. THE HISTORY OF CONSUMER PROTECTION 
Prior to modern state consumer protection laws, consumers could 
bring actions at common law for fraud or misrepresentation against 
sellers of goods or services. The Writ of Deceit was one of the earliest 
actions at common law, dating back to 1201.2 With such a long history, 
fraud and misrepresentation developed a clear jurisprudence. Early in 
this country’s development, the test for fraud or misrepresentation was 
described as: 
If a man represents as true that which he knows to be false, and 
makes the representation in such a way or under such 
circumstances as to induce a reasonable man to believe that it is 
true, and is meant to be acted on, and the person to whom the 
 
 1.  ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.50.471–45.50.561 (2010). 
 2.  DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 105, at 727 (5th ed. 
1984). 
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representation has been made, believing it to be true, acts upon 
the faith of it, and by so acting sustains damage, there is fraud 
to support an action of deceit at law, and to be a ground for the 
rescission of the transaction in equity.3 
In Alaska today, the test for intentional misrepresentation remains 
the same. “Alaska law imposes an independent duty to refrain from the 
tort of intentional misrepresentation. The essential elements of that tort 
are: (1) a false representation of fact, (2) knowledge of the falsity of the 
representation, (3) intention to induce reliance, (4) justifiable reliance, 
and (5) damages.”4 
An important element of the common law tort of fraud or 
intentional misrepresentation is the requirement of scienter. A plaintiff 
bringing an action for fraud or intentional misrepresentation must 
demonstrate “proof that the maker knew of the untrue character of his 
or her representation.”5 Further, a plaintiff must show that the 
defendant made a false representation, knew of the falsehood, and 
intended to misrepresent the information.6 Often these requirements 
create a significant hurdle to plaintiffs and limit consumers’ protection 
from fraud and misrepresentation.7 
Up until the early twentieth century, the predominant form of 
protection that the government provided to consumers was two Latin 
words of warning: caveat emptor.8 Caveat emptor left the consumer to his 
own judgment to determine the quality of a good or the accuracy of 
merchants’ sales pitches, and it assumed the consumer could bargain 
with merchants and choose which merchants to patronize on the basis of 
their reputations.9 This reliance on individualism and reputation for 
consumer protection worked in an economy where consumers did most 
of their dealing face to face with small merchants. But, as 
industrialization expanded the capabilities to produce and market goods 
to a large number of people, consumers began calling for an end to the 
 
 3.  Lowe v. Trundle, 78 Va. 65, 67 (1883) (citation omitted). 
 4.  Jarvis v. Ensminger, 134 P.3d 353, 363 (Alaska 2006) (citing City of 
Fairbanks v. Amoco Chem. Co., 952 P.2d 1173, 1176 n.4 (Alaska 1998)). 
 5.  Bubbel v. Wein Air Alaska, Inc., 682 P.2d 374, 381 (Alaska 1984) (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 530 cmt. b (1977)). 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  See William A. Lovett, Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: State Deceptive Trade 
Practice Legislation, 46 TUL. L. REV. 724, 754 n.86 (1972). 
 8.  See Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Common-Sense Construction of 
Consumer Protection Acts, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 7 (2005) (“Although the strength 
of caveat emptor as a concept in American law had diminished by the beginning 
of the twentieth century, common law remedies remained inadequate to protect 
consumers in some situations.”). 
 9.  Lovett, supra note 7, at 727. 
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doctrine of caveat emptor.10 While consumer movements began to erode 
the influence of caveat emptor through the beginning of the twentieth 
century, it was not until the 1930s and the strengthening of the FTC that 
the law departed from the doctrine of caveat emptor in any significant 
fashion.11 
A.  Nascent Consumer Protection: The Development of the Federal 
Trade Commission 
In 1914, Congress passed the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC 
Act),12 which was the first major step in consumer protection and unfair 
competition law. At its roots, however, the FTC was designed to prevent 
unethical business practices from harming the flow of commerce, not to 
protect consumers.13 It was essentially an extension and evolution of 
antitrust law.14 An early aim of the FTC was to “discover and make 
explicit those unexpressed standards of fair dealing which the 
conscience of the community may progressively develop.”15 Moreover, 
courts interpreted the FTC’s initial powers as covering only anti-
competitive practices between businesses, not as providing consumer 
protection.16 In FTC v. Raladam Co., the Supreme Court emphasized that 
the power of the FTC under section 5 of the FTC Act17 depended on the 
 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. at 728. 
 12.  Ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 
(2006)). 
 13.  See Michael I. Miller, Comment, The Class Action (Un)Fairness Act of 2005: 
Could it Spell the End of the Multi–State Consumer Class Action?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 
879, 883 (2009) (citing Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of “Unfair Acts or Practices” in 
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 70 GEO. L.J. 225, 226 (1981)); see also 
Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 8, at 7–8. 
 14.  Miller, supra note 13, at 883; see also Sheila B. Scheuerman, The Consumer 
Fraud Class Action: Reining in Abuse by Requiring Plaintiffs to Allege Reliance as an 
Essential Element, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 11 (2006) (the original purpose of the 
Federal Trade Commission was to curb monopolistic behavior on the part of 
businesses, not to help consumers). For a detailed historical review of events 
leading to the creation of the FTC, see Mark D. Bauer, The Licensed Professional 
Exemption in Consumer Protection: At Odds With Antitrust History and Precedent, 73 
TENN. L. REV. 131, 133–54 (2006). 
 15.  Stephen Buckingham, Comment, Distinguishing Deception and Fraud: 
Expanding the Scope of Statutory Remedies Available in Pennsylvania for Violations of 
State Consumer Protection Law, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1025, 1042 (2005) (quoting FTC v. 
Standard Educ. Soc’y, 86 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1936), rev’d in part, 302 U.S. 112 
(1937)). 
 16.  See FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 646–47 (1931). 
 17.  Section 5 of the original FTC Act stated, “unfair methods of competition 
in commerce are hereby declared unlawful. The Commission is hereby 
empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations . . . 
from using unfair methods of competition in commerce.” § 5, 38 Stat. at 719. 
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prerequisites “(1) that the methods complained of are unfair, [and] (2) 
that they are methods of competition in commerce.”18 Thus, the original 
FTC Act covered only “unfair method[s] of competition” that injured the 
business of a competitor, not deceptive or unfair practices that hurt only 
the consuming public.19 When all or most members of an industry used 
a deceptive practice that harmed consumers, the courts were unable to 
provide a remedy, as the practices were not unfair in the sense that they 
harmed competition.20 
Only in 1938 did the FTC begin to resemble the consumer 
watchdog it is today. In passing the Wheeler-Lea Act,21 Congress gave 
the FTC broad powers to regulate business practices that were unfair to 
the individual citizen-consumer.22 The FTC finally had the power to 
protect consumers with the declaration that “[u]nfair methods of 
competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in 
commerce, are . . . unlawful.”23 Further, Congress gave the FTC broad 
discretion regarding when, where, and how the Commission would 
act.24 Congress trusted the Commission to bring actions only when they 
were justified and in the interest of the public at large.25 
Given the choice to specifically proscribe defined instances of 
unfair or deceptive conduct, Congress declined because “it would 
undertake an endless task” if it tried to provide an exhaustive list of 
illegal actions.26 Also, Congress decided not to provide specific 
definitions for “unfair” and “deceptive,” choosing instead to allow its 
decisions and regulations to shape the meanings of the terms as times 
and practices changed.27 Such indeterminateness allowed for flexibility 
to evolve according to community standards and market changes.28 
 
 18.  Raladam, 283 U.S. at 646. 
 19.  See id. at 649; see also Scheuerman, supra note 14, at 11. 
 20.  See Pep Boys-Manny, Moe & Jack, Inc. v. FTC, 122 F.2d 158, 161 (3d Cir. 
1941) (noting that the FTC under the Raladam rule was powerless to help the 
public when there was not a threat to competition); see also Scheuerman, supra 
note 14, at 11. 
 21.  Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, ch. 49, 52 Stat. 111 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 45(a) (2006)). 
 22.  See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 8, at 8–9. 
 23.  See § 3, 52 Stat. at 111. 
 24.  See id. 
 25.  Jeff Sovern, Private Actions Under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act: 
Reconsidering the FTC as Rule Model, 52 OHIO ST. L. J. 437, 437 (1991). 
 26.  Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 8, at 8 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1142, at 
19 (1914) (Conf. Rep.)). 
 27.  Sovern, supra note 25, at 443. 
 28.  Glenn Kaplan & Chris Barry Smith, Patching the Holes in the Consumer 
Product Safety Net: Using State Unfair Practices Laws to Make Handguns and Other 
Consumer Goods Safer, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 299 (2000) (“UDAP statutes are 
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Congress has still not explicitly defined what constitutes a “deceptive” 
act or practice, and it did not do so with “unfair” acts or practices until 
the 1994 amendments narrowing the FTC Act.29 
Congress specifically chose not to grant individual private rights of 
action under the FTC Act. In fact, a proposal to allow a private right of 
action failed during the FTC Act negotiations; the opponents voiced 
concerns about abusive litigation by some plaintiffs’ attorneys.30 
Consumers were left with rights of action based in common law fraud or 
breach of contract.31 As a result, consumers generally found that it was 
“less expensive to suffer most deceptive trade practices than to remedy 
them through legal action.”32 
B.  Development of State Law “Little FTC Acts” 
The inadequacies of the FTC came to a head in the late 1960s when 
two independent incendiary reports were released chastising the FTC 
for its inefficiency and failure to benefit consumers.33 First, Ralph Nader 
led a group of law students—later termed Nader’s Raiders—who 
reviewed FTC documents and decisions.34 The Nader Report portrayed 
an ineffective and bureaucratic FTC with a long list of consumer 
protection failures.35 Second, in response to the Nader Report, President 
Nixon commissioned the American Bar Association (ABA) to review the 
 
undeniably, and purposefully, broad and flexible in scope, and the delegations 
of regulatory authority in those statutes are similarly broad.”). 
 29.  See Jeff Sovern, Protecting Privacy With Deceptive Trade Practices 
Legislation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1305, 1321 (2001) (citing Federal Trade 
Commission Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-312, 108 Stat. 1691 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2006))). 
 30.  Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 8, at 12 (citing 51 CONG. REC. 13,113–
18 (1914)). A proposed amendment to the Act by Senator Clapp of Minnesota 
would have provided: 
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by any 
other person or corporation by reason of anything forbidden or 
declared to be unlawful by this act may sue therefore in any district 
court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides 
or may be found, without respect to the amount in controversy, and 
shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained and the costs of 
the suit, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee. 
51 CONG. REC. 13,113. The amendment was rejected forty-one to eighteen. 
Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 8, at 14. 
 31.  Buckingham, supra note 15, at 1027. 
 32.  Id. (quoting Lovett, supra note 7, at 725). 
 33.  See Miller, supra note 13, at 886. 
 34.  EDWARD F. COX ET AL., “THE NADER REPORT” ON THE FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION 3 (Richard W. Baron Publishing Co. 2d ed. 1969). 
 35.  Id. at 37–95. 
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consumer protection efforts of the FTC.36 While the ABA Report was not 
as scathing as the Nader Report, it highlighted the same failures and 
found the FTC’s consumer protection efforts to be inadequate.37 
As the 1960s came to a close, the FTC was prepared to admit that it 
could not respond to all the consumer claims it received as well as unfair 
competition claims from businesses.38 An initial model for state 
legislation on consumer protection came from an FTC proposal itself, 
and the FTC collaborated with state governments and the Committee on 
Suggested State Legislation to develop false advertising statutes.39 
Similarly, in 1964 the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws drafted the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices 
Act.40 Unhappy with this effort,41 the FTC again collaborated with the 
Committee on Suggested State Legislation to develop its own model 
statute, the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law.42 
Three versions of the statute were promulgated to give state 
legislatures options in fitting the provision into existing state codes. The 
first option banned all “unfair methods of competition and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.”43 
The second provided a slightly modified provision against “false, 
misleading, or deceptive methods of competition and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.”44 
Finally, the third option listed twelve specific banned practices plus a 
catch-all provision that made illegal “any act or practice which is unfair 
or deceptive to the consumer.”45 The consumer protection movement 
 
 36.  Scheuerman, supra note 14, at 13 n.79; COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FTC, 
REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 4 
(1969) [hereinafter ABA Report]. 
 37.  See ABA Report, supra note 36, at 37. 
 38.  See Debra P. Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, Does Fraud Pay? An Empirical 
Analysis of Attorney’s Fees Provisions in Consumer Fraud Statutes, 56 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 483, 490–91 (2008). 
 39.  See Scheuerman, supra note 14, at 15; see also Lovett, supra note 7, at 730. 
 40.  UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT (1964) (amended 1966) 
(withdrawn 2000). 
 41.  Scheuerman, supra note 14, at 15. Specifically, the FTC disliked that the 
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act did not authorize action by the state 
attorney general and believed that the catch-all provision could cause confusion. 
Id. 
 42.  UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES AND CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW (1970) (Comm. 
on Suggested State Legislation). 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. The twelve enumerated deceptive practices were: 
(1) passes off goods or services as those of another; 
(2) causes likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the 
source, sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods or services; 
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quickly gained momentum, and by 1973, a mere three years later, forty-
four of the fifty states had already passed some version of the model 
act.46 
The various state consumer protection acts (CPAs) had done little 
to change the status quo by the mid-1970s. Both the FTC and the state 
attorneys general—who were initially the only parties capable of 
bringing state law actions—”confine[d] their activities to cases likely to 
have a broad impact.”47 The state attorneys general quickly found that 
they had the same problems that the FTC did prior to Ralph Nader’s 
excoriation: limited staff, limited resources, and an abundance of claims 
being filed by their citizens.48 Consequently, states gradually 
incorporated private rights of action for individual consumers to sue 
unsavory businesses.49 A private right of action alone may still under-
deter unfair and deceptive practices.50 To sweeten the pot, many states 
added treble damages, punitive damages, or statutory minimum 
 
(3) causes likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to 
affiliation, connection, or association with, or certification by, another; 
(4) uses deceptive representations or designations of geographic origin 
in connection with goods or services; 
(5) represents that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, 
characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities that they do not 
have or that a person has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or 
connection that he does not have; 
(6) represents that goods are original or new if they are deteriorated, 
altered, reconditioned, reclaimed, used, or second-hand; 
(7) represents that goods or services are of a particular standard, 
quality, or grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if they 
are of another; 
(8) disparages the goods, services, or business of another by false or 
misleading representation of fact; 
(9) advertises goods or services with intent not to sell them as 
advertised; 
(10) advertises goods or services with intent not to supply reasonably 
expectable public demand, unless the advertisement discloses a 
limitation of quantity; 
(11) makes false or misleading statements of fact concerning the reasons 
for, existence of, or amounts of price reductions; or 
(12) engages in any other conduct which similarly creates a likelihood 
of confusion or of misunderstanding. 
UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT § 2 (1966); see also Sovern, supra note 25, at 
446–47. 
 46.  Scheuerman, supra note 14, at 17–18. 
 47.  Jon Mize, Comment, Fencing Off the Path of Least Resistance: Re-Examining 
the Role of Little FTC Act Actions in the Law of False Advertising, 72 TENN. L. REV. 
653, 660 (2005) (quoting Sovern, supra note 25, at 448). 
 48.  Sovern, supra note 25, at 448. 
 49.  Id. at 448–49. 
 50.  See William A. Lovett, Private Actions for Deceptive Trade Practices, 23 
ADMIN. L. REV. 271, 289 (1971). 
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damages provisions.51 Many also awarded attorneys’ fees to prevailing 
consumer plaintiffs to incentivize the bringing of actions.52 
C.  Modern State Consumer Protection Acts—The Rise of Private 
Actions 
Today, the CPA laws of the fifty states and the District of 
Columbia53 have each evolved based on the needs of the citizens and the 
demands of the era. Ensuring that victims of consumer fraud have 
access to the courts is particularly important in today’s climate of 
predatory lending, identity theft, and e-commerce situations in which 
 
 51.  See Stark & Choplin, supra note 38, at 495. 
 52.  Id. at 484. 
 53.  See Scheuerman, supra note 14, at 18–20; CAROLYN L. CARTER & 
JONATHON SHELDON, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES app. A (7th ed. 
2008). The fifty state statutes currently in effect are: ALA. CODE §§ 8-19-1–8-19-15 
(2010); ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.50.471–45.50.561 (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-
1521–44-1534 (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-88-101–4-88-207 (2010); CAL. CIV. CODE 
§§ 1750–1785 (West 2010); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-1-101–6-1-115 (2010); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. §§ 42-110a–42-110q (2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2511–2527, 2580–2584 
(2010) (Consumer Fraud Act); id. §§ 2531–2536 (2010) (Deceptive Trade Practices 
Act); D.C. CODE §§ 28-3901–28-3913 (2010); FLA. STAT. §§ 501.201–501.213 (2010); 
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-370–10-1-375 (2011); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 480-1–480-24 
(2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 48-601–48-619 (2010); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/1–
505/12 (2010) (Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act); id. at 
510/1–510/7; IND. CODE §§ 24-5-0.5-1–24-5-0.5-12 (2010); IOWA CODE §§ 714.16–
714.16A (2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-623–50-640, 50-675a–50-679a (2009); KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 367.110–367.990 (LexisNexis 2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
51:1401–51:1420 (2010); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 10, §§ 1211–1216 (2009); MD. CODE 
ANN., COM. LAW §§ 13-101–13-501 (LexisNexis 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.93A §§ 
1–11 (2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 445.901–445.922 (2010); MINN. STAT. §§ 
325D.43–325D.48 (2010); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 407.010–407.307 (2010); MONT. CODE 
ANN. §§ 30-14-101–30-14-142 (2010); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 87-301–87-306 (2010); 
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 598.0903–598.0999 (2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 358-A:1–
358-A:13 (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-1–56:8-91 (West 2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 57-12-1–57-12-22 (2010); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 349–350 (Consol. 2010); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. §§ 75-1.1–75-35 (2010); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 51-15-01–51-15-11 (2009); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4165.01–4165.04 (LexisNexis 2010); OKLA. STAT. tit. 78, 
§§ 51–55 (2010); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 646.605–646.656 (2009); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 
201-1–201-10 (2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 6-13.1-1–6-13.1-27 (2010); S.C. CODE ANN. 
§§ 39-5-10–39-5-160 (2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 37-24-1–37-24-35 (2010); TENN. 
CODE ANN. §§ 47-18-101–47-18-125 (2010); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41–
17.63 (West 2009); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-2-1–13-2-8 (LexisNexis 2010); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2451–2480g (2010); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-196–59.1-207 (2010); 
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.86.010–19.86.920 (2010); W. VA. CODE §§ 46A-6-101–46A-
6-110 (2010); WIS. STAT. §§ 100.18, 100.20–100.264 (2010); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-
12-101–40-12-114 (2010); 5 GUAM CODE ANN. §§ 32101–32603 (2010); P.R. LAWS 
ANN. tit. 3, §§ 341–341w (2010); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 12A, §§ 101–123, 180–185 
(2010). 
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there is never face to face contact with a fraudulent merchant.54 States 
articulated five predominant legislative purposes in passing “Little 
FTC” CPAs: 
1) To wholly compensate victims for losses; 
2) To punish fraudulent offenders; 
3) To make the bringing of cases feasible even when 
attorneys’ fees might be greater than a potential 
damages award; 
4) To encourage members of the bar to take on 
consumer protection cases; and 
5) To deter future fraud, deception, and unfair trade 
practices.55 
The most important difference between the FTC Act and “Little 
FTC Acts” is a private right of action.56 In 2009, Iowa became the last of 
the fifty states to grant a private right of action for consumer fraud 
claims.57 Private rights of action allow consumers to protect themselves 
from fraud, misrepresentation, and other deceptive trade practices 
without the constraints that come with actions at common law, and they 
provide an extra deterrent to injurious merchants and businesses.58 
During the period when states enacted “Little FTC Acts,” one consumer 
protection advocate argued: “Without effective private remedies the 
widespread economic losses that result from these trade practices 
remain uncompensated, and furthermore, private remedies are highly 
desirable for additional consumer bargaining power and more complete 
discipline against fraud in the marketplace.”59 Several features of “Little 
FTC Acts” help to encourage consumer actions; however, these features 
vary widely across the states. These features, and their differences, are 
discussed in the following sections. 
 
 54.  See Stark & Choplin, supra note 38, at 488; see also Sovern, supra note 29, 
at 1354–58 (examining the roles of state CPAs in e-commerce and personal data 
management contexts). 
 55.  Stark & Choplin, supra note 38, at 499. 
 56.  Jack E. Karns, State Regulation of Deceptive Trade Practices Under “Little 
FTC Acts”: Should Federal Standards Control?, 94 DICK. L. REV. 373, 375 (1990); see 
also DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, 1 CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE 
LAW § 2:10, at 41 (2010); Scheuerman, supra note 14, at 23–25. During the same 
time that states were enacting consumer protection statutes, the Nixon 
administration attempted to develop a federal private right of action for unfair 
or deceptive trade practices, but internal opposition resulted in the proposition 
never gaining any real traction. Lovett, supra note 50, 279–80. 
 57.  Rob Sand, Note, Fraud’s Final Frontier: Iowa’s Battle Over Becoming the 
Final State to Allow Private Consumer Fraud Actions, 35 IOWA J. CORP. L. 615, 623 
(2010). The bill was H.F. 712, 84th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2009). 
 58.  Stark & Choplin, supra note 38, at 484. 
 59.  Lovett, supra note 50, at 271. 
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1. Increased Damages Awards 
Most unfair or deceptive trade practices do not result in significant 
harm to individual consumers.60 Consequently, normal remedies would 
result in little incentive for any injured parties to bring claims of unfair 
or deceptive trade practices.61 The punishment and deterrent functions 
of private actions would not materialize.62 To encourage private parties 
to litigate their unfair or deceptive trade practices claims, CPAs allow 
for various methods to increase damages.63 
Similarly, harm from unfair or deceptive practices normally falls 
below the costs of bringing a lawsuit.64 Without an award of attorneys’ 
fees, “the costs of going to court were so formidable that it was rarely 
worth it for consumers to litigate claims involving relatively small 
amounts of money.”65 To encourage private actions and to “mak[e] the 
consumer’s access to justice really viable,”66 consumer protection 
statutes typically allow for prevailing plaintiffs to recover reasonable 
attorneys’ fees and court costs.67 
Twenty states set a minimum damages award for successful 
plaintiffs to encourage litigation of harms normally too insignificant to 
litigate.68 The minimum damages award varies from as low as $2569 to as 
high as $2000,70 and the plaintiff is awarded the higher of the actual or 
 
 60.  In a survey on consumer fraud conducted in 2005, the FTC found the 
median loss due to fraud to be $60. KEITH B. ANDERSON, FTC, CONSUMER FRAUD 
IN THE UNITED STATES: THE SECOND FTC SURVEY 45 (2007), available at 
http://ftc.gov/opa/2007/10/fraud.pdf. 
 61.  CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 53, § 13.1, at 807. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 56, § 6:10, at 448–50. 
 64.  See ANDERSON, supra note 60, at 47 (finding the median amount paid in 
connection with consumer fraud was $60 and the seventy-fifth percentile was 
$200). 
 65.  PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 56, § 6:17, at 476. 
 66.  Lovett, supra note 7, at 744. 
 67.  See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 8, at 25–26; Stark & Choplin, supra 
note 38, at 484, 496 (surveying consumer protection laws in all fifty states and 
finding that forty-five allow for courts to award plaintiffs attorneys’ fees); see also 
PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 56, app. 6A at 541–43 (providing a table of the 
availability of attorneys’ fees for unfair and deceptive practices claims). 
 68.  See PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 56, § 6:10, at 448–49; see also id. § 
6:11, at 450, app. 6A at 542–43; see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-19-10(a)(1) (2010) (greater 
of actual damages or $100); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1780 (West 2010) (actual damages 
but not less than $1000); COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-113(2) (2010) (greater of actual 
damages or $500); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 9(3) (2010) (greater of actual 
damages or $25); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.911(2) (2010) (greater of actual 
damages or $250); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-133(1) (2010) (greater of actual 
damages or $500); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-19(2) (2010) (greater of actual 
damages or $2000). 
 69.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 9(3) (2010). 
 70.  UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-19(2) (2010). 
OQUINNWATTERSON.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2011  5:18 PM 
306 ALASKA LAW REVIEW VOL. 28:2 
statutory damages. Some states also extend minimum damages to deter 
particular frauds, primarily those against the elderly.71 Further, a 
plaintiff does not always need to show any damages in order to collect 
statutory damages.72 
Most states allow courts to treble damages in private consumer 
protection lawsuits in order to punish some forms of bad behavior.73 
Treble damages, unlike statutory minimum damages, require the 
plaintiff to show actual damages.74 In some states, treble damages apply 
when a trier of fact finds the defendant acted willfully, knowingly, 
intentionally, or in bad faith.75 A few states provide treble damages to 
every plaintiff who shows a violation of the consumer protection 
statute.76 Generally, because actual damages must be shown and 
because there is often a trigger requiring some form of bad behavior, 
treble damages help deter larger frauds while minimum damages help 
deter smaller frauds.77 
A smaller number of states explicitly allow judges to award 
punitive damages to successful plaintiffs.78 Punitive damages in 
consumer protection acts serve the same purposes as in common law 
fraud actions—they are intended to punish egregious actions and to 
deter other potential injurers.79 Some consumer protection acts call for 
punitive damages when the defendant injured some vulnerable class of 
victims, such as the elderly or disabled.80 
 
 71.  See PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 56, app.6A at 542–43; see, e.g., HAW. 
REV. STAT. § 480-13(b)(1) (2010). 
 72.  See Carter v. LaChance, 766 A.2d 717, 719 (N.H. 2001) (interpreting the 
New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 358-A:1–
358-A:13 (2010), which states that the court “shall award” minimum damages 
upon a showing of a violation of the statute, to mean that the plaintiff does not 
need to demonstrate actual damages). 
 73.  Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 8, at 23; PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra 
note 56, § 6:10, at 449. 
 74.  PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 56, § 6:10, at 449; see, e.g., Sign-O-Lite 
Signs, Inc. v. DeLaurenti Florists, Inc., 825 P.2d 714, 721 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992). 
 75.  PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 56, § 6:10, at 449; see, e.g., GA. CODE 
ANN. § 10-1-399(c) (2010) (requiring treble damages for intentional violations); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 9(3) (2010) (allowing a court to award up to three 
times actual damages for willful and knowing violations). 
 76.  ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.531(a) (2010); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3905(k) 
(LexisNexis 2010); HAW. REV. STAT. § 480-13 (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19 
(West 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (2010); see Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 
8, at 23. 
 77.  See PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 56, § 6:10, at 449. 
 78.  Id. § 6:16, at 467. 
 79.  Id. § 6.16, at 467–68. 
 80.  See CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 53, at 845; see, e.g., ARK CODE ANN. § 4-
88-204 (2010). 
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2. Class Actions 
Class actions provide another method to remedy wrongs that cause 
only small harms against individuals, but the collective harm is large 
enough to warrant litigation costs. Critics of class action suits claim that 
plaintiffs’ attorneys seeking a windfall, rather than aggrieved 
consumers, pursue them, and the attorneys bring cases regardless of 
whether they are meritorious.81 Further, because damages and litigation 
costs are so high for class actions, even innocent defendants may settle a 
claim to avoid a costly trial or any risk of a potentially bankrupting 
settlement.82 
“Little FTC Acts” vary widely in how they treat class action 
lawsuits. A few states explicitly prohibit class actions by private 
parties.83 Others explicitly provide that class action suits are available to 
plaintiffs.84 The majority of “Little FTC Acts” remain silent on the 
availability of class action suits.85 Where the legislation neither prohibits 
nor authorizes class action consumer protection suits, most states allow 
class actions under their general rules.86 
Because class actions present lucrative opportunities for named 
plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ attorneys, some states that allow consumer 
 
 81.  See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING 
PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 4 (2000); see generally Scheuerman, supra note 14. 
 82.  Scheuerman, supra note 14, at 38. 
 83.  ALA. CODE § 8-19-10(f) (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-399(a) (2010); LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1409(A) (2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-15(4) (2010); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 30.14-133(1) (2010); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-5-202(1), (3) (2010); see also 
PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 56, app.6A at 541–43. 
 84.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1781 (2010); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3905(k)(1) 
(LexisNexis 2010); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 480-13(c) (LexisNexis 2010); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 48-608(1) (2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-0.5-4(b) (LexisNexis 2010); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-634(b)–(d) (2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 9(2) 
(West 2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.911(3) (West 2010); MO. ANN. STAT. § 
407.025(2)–(3) (West 2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:10-a (LexisNexis 2010); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-10(E) (LexisNexis 2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
1345.09(B) (LexisNexis 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-5.2(b) (2010); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 13-11-19(3) (West 2010); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-108(b) (2010); see also 
PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 56, app.6A at 541–43. 
 85.  Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 8, at 29; PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra 
note 56, § 6:29, at 516, app.6A at 541–43. 
 86.  Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 8, at 29; PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra 
note 56, § 6:29, at 516. The general rationale for allowing consumer protection 
class actions when the “Little FTC Act” remains silent on the issue is that 
“[u]nless there is a clear and direct statutory provision precluding class actions 
for a given cause of action, then class actions are authorized.” Karen S. Little, 
LLC v. Drury Inns, Inc., 306 S.W.3d 577, 583 (Mo. App. Ct. 2010); cf. Tucker v. 
Sierra Builders, 180 S.W.3d 109, 115 n.9 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (“The [Tennessee 
Consumer Protection] Act limits private actions to ‘individual’ claims. 
Accordingly, class actions cannot be maintained under the TCPA.”). 
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protection class actions have restrictions or safeguards against abuse.87 
A few states limit the recovery in consumer protection class action suits 
to actual damages and prevent plaintiffs from recovering statutory or 
minimum damages.88 
3. The Reliance Requirement 
In a common law action for fraud or misrepresentation, plaintiffs 
must show that they relied on a vendor’s statements and that the 
reliance was justified before recovering any damages allegedly caused 
by a misstatement.89 A few states continue to require plaintiffs in 
consumer protection cases to show reliance on an alleged 
misrepresentation,90 but most do not require any showing of reliance.91 
Those states that do not require a showing of reliance generally follow 
the test from federal FTC cases: whether the act has the tendency or 
capacity to deceive consumers.92 By eliminating the reliance 
requirement, those states eliminated a hurdle for plaintiffs but also 
allowed for awards based on conduct that may have caused no harm.93 
D.  The Evolution of State CPAs 
States found that “Little FTC Acts” provided citizens and 
businesses with “double barrel” protection when the “big FTC” in 
Washington could not or would not act.94 Attorneys general could bring 
large actions in the public interest on behalf of the state, while 
individual consumers could bring smaller private actions with bonuses 
such as statutory damages and attorneys’ fees.95 Though generally based 
on the same model acts, the state statutes quickly began to diverge in 
language and application.96 On one extreme, California’s Unfair 
Competition Law97 allows virtually anyone to sue on the basis of 
consumer fraud on behalf of the public, regardless of whether they were 
 
 87.  PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 56, § 6:34, at 536. 
 88.  Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 8, at 29; see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-
1-113(2) (2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.09(E) (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-
11-19(2) (2010). 
 89.  PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 56, § 3:3, at 56–57; see also Lowe v. 
Trundle, 78 Va. 65, 67 (1883). 
 90.  Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 8, at 18. 
 91.  Id. at 19; PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 56, § 3:4, at 57. 
 92.  Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 8, at 19. 
 93.  See Scheuerman, supra note 14, at 38. 
 94.  Sovern, supra note 29, at 1349–51. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  See generally James P. Nehf, Textualism in the Lower Courts: Lessons from 
Judges Interpreting Consumer Legislation, 26 RUTGERS L. J. 1, 7 (1994). 
 97.  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 1997). 
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personally injured or even impacted.98 On the other extreme, as 
previously mentioned, Iowa had no private action at all until late 2009 
and only established one in response to price gouging during relief 
efforts from a disastrous flood.99 
CPAs were not intended to be limitless, although increasingly 
“creative” applications of them in the courts may make them seem so. 
Reverence for federal FTC precedent and careful definitions are among 
the statutory tools that states can employ to rein in use of consumer 
statutes.100 Analysis can be difficult; as these statutes typically have been 
on the books for only forty years or less, common law decisions are 
fewer than in more established fields of law. Many states choose to defer 
to FTC decisions and federal court interpretations, but federal appellate 
courts and FTC panels handle cases from different perspectives and 
with different resources than a lower state court.101 Even if a state 
purports to align its consumer action analysis with the FTC, it often falls 
short in practice. This dichotomy can result in clear federal FTC 
violations not violating state CPAs, and vice versa.102 
One major issue is that the field is still unsettled and rapidly 
developing; with relatively little common law to guide them, many state 
courts treat every case as one of first impression and interpret CPAs 
inconsistently.103 Much as Justice Louis Brandeis104 and later Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor105 proclaimed that states should serve as 
legislative laboratories, each state has had to examine and, when 
needed, amend and update its CPA statute to better serve its citizens. 
The next section will examine Alaska’s version of the statute as well as 
how the Alaska courts and Legislature have dealt with some of these 
challenges. 
 
 98.  Alan S. Brown & Larry E. Hepler, Comparison of Consumer Fraud Statutes 
Across the Fifty States, 55 FDCC QUARTERLY 263, 265–66 (2005). 
 99.  See Sand, supra note 57. 
 100.  Kaplan & Smith, supra note 28, at 281. 
 101.  See Nehf, supra note 96, at 7. 
 102.  Richard E. Day, The South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act: Sleeping 
Giant or Elusive Panacea?, 33 S.C. L. REV. 479, 507 (1982). 
 103.  Bauer, supra note 14, at 132. 
 104.  See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory.”). 
 105.  See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(“This case exemplifies the role of States as laboratories. The States’ core police 
powers have always included authority to define criminal law and to protect the 
health, safety, and welfare of their citizens.”). 
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II. THE ALASKA UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES AND CONSUMER 
PROTECTION ACT 
Amidst the developing consumer protection backdrop, Alaska has 
continued to refine its own UTPCPA since its initial enactment in 
1970.106 Alaska based the UTPCPA “on legislation developed in large 
part by the Federal Trade Commission, [and it] is designed to meet the 
increasing need in Alaska for the protection of consumers as well as 
honest businessmen from the depredations of those persons employing 
unfair or deceptive trade practices.”107 The language in Alaska’s 
UTPCPA parallels the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act108 drafted 
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.109 
As a result, Alaska’s Act contains a list of specifically prohibited 
practices that is followed by a catch-all provision. Alaska adopted a 
modified version of the twelve enumerated practices from the model 
act110—but then added even more. As of January 2011, there are fifty-
seven acts or practices banned in the “laundry list.”111 The Alaska 
Legislature appears far from daunted by the “endless task” of 
identifying prohibited acts.112 
Some commentators have asked whether the “laundry list” state 
consumer protection statutes may run into constitutionality issues. 
Specifically, even though the statute explicitly states that the list of 
enumerated practices is non-exclusive,113 could a defendant challenge 
the statute facially on void-for-vagueness grounds?114 In State v. O’Neill 
 
 106.  ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471 (b)(1)–(57) (2010). 
 107.  Judiciary Committee Report on HCSCS for Senate Bill No. 352, ALASKA H. 
JOURNAL SUPP. NO. 10 AT 1, 1970 ALASKA H. JOURNAL 744. 
 108.  UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT (1964) (amended 1966) 
(withdrawn 2000). 
 109.  W. Star Trucks, Inc. v. Big Iron Equip. Serv., Inc., 101 P.3d 1047, 1052–53 
(Alaska 2004). 
 110.  Compare ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471(b)(1)–(11) with the twelve practices 
enumerated in note 45, supra. Alaska appears to have combined the first two 
enumerated practices in the model statute. 
 111.  ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471(b)(1)–(57). 
 112.  See H.R. REP. NO. 1142, at 19 (1914) (Conf. Rep.); see also text 
accompanying note 26. 
 113.  It actually does so in two places. ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471(b) (“The 
terms ‘unfair methods of competition’ and ‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices’ 
include, but are not limited to, the following acts.”); ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471(c) 
(“The unlawful acts and practices listed in (b) of this section are in addition to 
and do not limit the types of unlawful acts and practices actionable at common 
law or under other state statutes.”). 
 114.  For a well-reasoned debate regarding a statute of similar construction, 
see Albert L. Norton, Jr., The South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act and the 
Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine, 40 S.C. L. REV. 641 (1989). Norton concluded that the 
South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act was likely unconstitutionally vague. 
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Investigations, Inc. the Alaska Supreme Court held that the UTPCPA is 
not unconstitutionally vague, and it also importantly noted that the 
statute is remedial rather than penal.115 With constitutional challenges 
out of the way, Alaska plaintiffs put the UTPCPA to frequent use—
within four years of O’Neill Investigations, Alaska was second in the 
nation in complaints brought under CPAs per capita, with 6.39 actions 
brought per 1000 Alaska residents.116 
The rest of this part will highlight some of the notable features 
available to consumers in the UTPCPA. 
A.  Mechanisms of Plaintiffs’ Actions 
Like most states, Alaska permits consumer actions to be brought 
under the statute by both the state attorney general and individual 
consumers. As discussed previously, most actions brought by state 
attorneys general mirror those brought by the federal FTC—generally 
large actions that are clearly in the public interest.117 Although Alaska’s 
UTPCPA does not explicitly authorize or prohibit private parties from 
bringing class action lawsuits,118 class actions are permitted by Alaska 
Civil Rule 23.119 
Smaller actions are cost prohibitive and difficult to fully investigate, 
particularly given Alaska’s unique geography. The attorney general 
 
One convincing piece of evidence against such a statute being unconstitutional is 
that the federal FTC Act has been held by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit not to be overly vague. The panel held that “unfair methods of 
competition” is no more vague than “due process of law.” Id. at 644–45 (quoting 
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 258 F. 307, 311 (7th Cir. 1919)). 
 115.  Id. at 647–48, 659 (citing State v. O’Neill Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d 520 
(Alaska 1980)). Notably, the O’Neill Investigations court did state in dicta that 
although the statute was not unconstitutionally vague, there were no guiding 
regulations promulgated by the Attorney General’s office to aid with application 
and interpretation of the statute: “We think that it would be the better practice 
for the Attorney General to exercise his discretionary rule-making power to fill 
in the interstices of the Alaska Act rather than relying exclusively on 
adjudication.” 609 P.2d at 533 n.49. 
 116.  Anthony Paul Dunbar, Comment, Consumer Protection: The Practical 
Effectiveness of State Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation, 59 TUL. L. REV. 427, 440 
(1984). Delaware was first on the list, but the unusual number of companies 
incorporated there (with little other presence) and the liberal construction of its 
statute make it something of an anomaly. Based on actions brought by actual 
citizens against businesses doing business within the state’s borders, Alaska may 
well have been number one. 
 117.  Mize, supra note 47, at 660. 
 118.  The title of section 45.50.531 of the Alaska Statutes is “[p]rivate and class 
actions,” but the text does not mention class action suits. See ALASKA STAT. § 
45.50.531 (2010). 
 119.  See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 23; see, e.g., Turner v. Alaska Commc’ns Sys. Long 
Distance, Inc., 78 P.3d 264 (Alaska 2003). 
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cannot represent or advise individual citizens, who must have a private 
attorney in all other circumstances.120 The exception is consumer claims 
involving less than $10,000, in which case citizens can bring the action 
themselves in small claims court without an attorney present.121 
Alaska is one of the most aggressive states with respect to how 
deeply attorney general actions penetrate the traditional domain of tort 
law. For example, in O’Neill Investigations, the state brought an action 
based on harassment, typically governed solely by tort law.122 The court 
found that harassment of citizens over the phone by debt collectors was 
an unfair or deceptive trade practice under section 45.50.471(a) of the 
Alaska Statutes, presumably by using the “catch-all” provision.123 The 
infusion of tort law causes of action into consumer protection statutes is 
an example of how different states diverge in interpretation. North 
Carolina’s consumer protection statute124 is very similar in its structure 
to the Alaska UTPCPA, but North Carolina courts went the opposite 
direction, holding that actions brought on the basis of traditional tort 
law are not valid uses of the statute.125 
Alaska is similar to many other states in that the burden of proof 
for plaintiffs bringing consumer actions is substantially lower than the 
burden in related actions such as breach of contract or common law 
fraud.126 Often consumer protection actions do not require particularity 
of pleading—effectively allowing attorneys general and citizens, 
including plaintiffs lawyers, to sue now and find evidence (or hope for a 
settlement) later.127 Critics allege that this makes state CPA claims, 
including those in Alaska, exploitable as a “pile-on” charge—a fallback 
with lower standards of proof that might stick when other tort law 
 
 120.  ALASKA DEP’T OF LAW, CONSUMER PROTECTION UNIT, CONSUMER 
PROTECTION IN ALASKA 2 (2010), available at 
http://www.law.state.ak.us/pdf/consumer/BrochureGeneric_web.pdf. 
(hereinafter CONSUMER PROTECTION UNIT). 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  State v. O’Neill Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d 520, 536 (Alaska 1980); 
Dunbar, supra note 116, at 451. 
 123.  A specific provision on the “laundry list” addressing telephone 
solicitation was not added until 1993. 1993 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 60, 3 (codified 
at ALASKA STAT. § 45.63); ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471(b)(35) (2010) (listing violating 
AS 45.63 (solicitations by telephonic means) as an unfair or deceptive trade 
practice). 
 124.  N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-1–75-49 (2010). 
 125.  See Dunbar, supra note 116, at 451 n.42. 
 126.  See, e.g., Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 8, at 5. (“State consumer 
protection statutes have their origin in common law fraud and 
misrepresentation claims as well as in federal consumer protection law. Yet, 
when states adopted CPAs, they did not explicitly include many of the required 
elements of the common law actions in the statutes.”). 
 127.  Id. at 33–34. 
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claims do not.128 For example, a recent federal case applying Alaska law 
saw the plaintiffs, franchisees of a rental car company, assert twelve 
separate causes of action in a suit against the parent company that 
included UTPCPA claims alongside traditional breach of contract and 
fraud claims.129 None of the nine states with “laundry list” consumer 
protection acts that include a “catch-all” provision130 require plaintiffs to 
prove the elements of common law fraud in consumer protection 
actions.131 In Alaska, this has been the law since O’Neill Investigations.132 
To bring an action, first a plaintiff must have standing.133 “The basic 
requirement for standing in Alaska is adversity.”134 To bring a UTPCPA 
claim the plaintiff must have interest-injury standing.135 “Under the 
interest-injury standing test . . . [plaintiffs] must have an interest 
adversely affected by the actions of [the defendants], and they must 
have a ‘sufficient personal stake in the controversy to guarantee . . . 
adversity.’”136 
Then, “[t]wo elements must be proved to establish a prima facie 
case of unfair or deceptive acts or practices under the [UTPCPA]: (1) that 
the defendant is engaged in trade or commerce; and (2) that in the 
 
 128.  Victor E. Schwartz, Cary Silverman & Christopher E. Appel, “That’s 
Unfair!” Says Who—The Government or the Litigant?: Consumer Protection Claims 
Involving Regulated Conduct, 47 WASHBURN L. J. 93, 94–95 (2007). 
In many instances, CPA claims are “piled on” to product liability and 
other tort claims. In other words, a plaintiffs’ lawyer may assert CPA 
claims as a fallback should he or she fail to show that the product was 
defective, that the defendant was negligent, or that his or her client was 
injured as a result. 
Id. 
 129.  Alaska Rent–A–Car, Inc. v. Cendant Corp., No. 3:03-cv-00029-TMB, 2007 
WL 2206784, at *1 (D. Alaska July 27, 2007). 
 130.  See Buckingham, supra note 15, at 1034 nn.97 & 101. As of the latter part 
of the decade, those states were Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471 (2010)), 
Georgia (Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-371 
(2010)), Idaho (Idaho Consumer Protection Act, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-601 
(2010)), Maryland (Maryland Consumer Protection Act, MD. CODE ANN., Com. 
Law § 13-101 (2010)), Mississippi (MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-1 (2010)), New 
Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:1 (2010)), Rhode Island (Unfair Trade 
Practice and Consumer Protection Act, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-1 (2010)), and 
Tennessee (Tennessee Consumer Protection Act of 1977, TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-
18-101 (2010)). 
 131.  Buckingham, supra note 15, at 1034–37. 
 132.  Id.; see also State v. O’Neill Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d 520, 534–35 
(Alaska 1980). 
 133.  Neese v. Lithia Chrysler Jeep of Anchorage, Inc., 210 P.3d 1213, 1218 
(Alaska 2009). 
 134.  Trustees for Alaska v. State, 736 P.2d 324, 327 (Alaska 1987). 
 135.  Neese, 210 P.3d at 1219. 
 136.  Id. (quoting Adams v. Pipeliners Union 798, 699 P.2d 343, 346 (Alaska 
1985)). 
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conduct of trade or commerce, an unfair act or practice has occurred.”137 
First, an act or practice must be in the conduct of trade or commerce to 
fall under the UTPCPA because “the entire thrust of the [UTPCPA] is 
directed at regulating practices relating to transactions involving 
consumer goods and services.”138 The term “consumer goods” is 
“generally understood to mean goods ‘used or bought for use primarily 
for personal, family, or household purposes.’”139 For instance, the 
UTPCPA applies to services such as repairs140 and debt collection.141 
Real property, however, is not a consumer good.142 Further, even the 
sale of standing timber falls beyond the scope of the UTPCPA because it 
is not a “consumer good” but rather real property.143 Similarly, the 
servicing of a mortgage does not fall under the UTPCPA.144 While the 
product must be a consumer good or service, the UTPCPA can still 
apply to business-to-business transactions.145 
Once an act or practice is in the conduct of trade or commerce, the 
plaintiff must then show that the act or practice is unfair or deceptive.146 
Alaska adopted the FTC definition of unfair or deceptive: “[a]n act or 
practice is deceptive or unfair if it has the capacity or tendency to 
deceive.”147 An act or practice can be unfair without being deceptive; in 
order to determine if an act or practice is unfair, a trier of fact should 
rely on: 
(1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been 
previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has 
been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise 
whether, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of 
some common-law, statutory, or other established concept of 
unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or 
 
 137.  O’Neill Investigations, 609 P.2d at 534. 
 138.  State v. First Nat’l Bank of Anchorage, 660 P.2d 406, 412 (Alaska 1982). 
 139.  Aloha Lumber Corp. v. Univ. of Alaska, 994 P.2d 991, 1002 (Alaska 1999) 
(quoting ALASKA STAT. § 45.09.109 (2010)). 
 140.  See ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471(b)(15) (2010) (repair services). 
 141.  O’Neill Investigations, 609 P.2d at 534 (finding defendant debt collector 
was “engaged in trade or commerce as a business entity, regulated under the 
Department of Commerce”). 
 142.  First Nat’l Bank, 609 P.2d at 412–14 (using the listed prohibitions in 
section 45.50.471(b) of the Alaska Statutes as examples of consumer goods and 
stating that the statute was “directed solely at regulating transactions involving 
‘products and services sold to consumers in the popular sense.’” (quoting 
Neveroski v. Blair, 358 A.2d 473, 480 (N.J. 1976))). 
 143.  O’Neill Investigations, 609 P.2d at 534. 
 144.  Barber v. Nat’l Bank of Alaska, 815 P.2d 857, 861 (Alaska 1991). 
 145.  W. Star Trucks, Inc. v. Big Iron Equip. Serv., Inc., 101 P.3d 1047, 1052–53 
(Alaska 2004). 
 146.  See O’Neill Investigations, 609 P.2d at 534. 
 147.  Id. at 534 (citing FTC v. Raladam Co., 316 U.S. 149, 152 (1942)). 
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unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to 
consumers (or competitors or other businessmen).148 
The plaintiff need not prove intent to deceive, or even that 
deception actually happened; “[a]ll that is required is a showing that the 
acts and practices were capable of being interpreted in a misleading 
way.”149 Indeed, “[t]estimony of consumers that they were misled is 
sufficient to sustain a prima facie case of unfair and deceptive 
practices.”150 However, in Garrison v. Dixon151 the Alaska Supreme Court 
held that a claim that was sufficient to meet the minimum standard in 
Odom v. Fairbanks Memorial Hospital failed when the plaintiffs “never 
produced credible evidence” to support the claim and the plaintiffs 
brought the action in bad faith.152 In Kenai Chrysler Center, Inc. v. 
Denison,153 the Alaska Supreme Court applied a flexible and case-specific 
approach to find that a car dealership violated the UTPCPA in selling a 
car to a developmentally disabled adult.154 There, the court specifically 
noted that “[m]any other jurisdictions define ‘unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices’ to extend beyond conduct specifically prohibited by statute or 
common law; instead of looking for expressly prohibited conduct, these 
cases focus on the unfairness of the disputed practice under the specific 
circumstances presented.”155 
B.  Damages 
The UTPCPA allows the attorney general to obtain injunctive relief 
on behalf of citizens as well as restitution and civil penalties ranging 
from $1,000 to $25,000.156 Alaska is in the minority of states that allow 
 
 148.  Id. at 535 (quoting FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244–45 
n.5 (1972)); see also Kenai Chrysler Ctr., Inc. v. Denison, 167 P.3d 1240, 1255–57 
(Alaska 2007). 
 149.  Odom v. Fairbanks Mem’l Hosp., 999 P.2d 123, 132 (Alaska 2000) 
(quoting O’Neill Investigations, 609 P.2d at 534–35). 
 150.  O’Neill Investigations, 609 P.2d at 535. 
 151.  19 P.3d 1229 (Alaska 2001). 
 152.  Id. at 1235. 
 153.  167 P.3d 1240 (Alaska 2007). 
 154.  Id. at 1256. 
 155.  Id. The court looked to a Fourth Circuit case that defined an unfair trade 
practice as an “inequitable assertion of power or position” and found that it is 
possible for the exercise of a contractual right, “when it involves egregious and 
aggravating conduct, to constitute an unfair . . . trade practice.” Id. (quoting S. 
Atl. Ltd. P’ship of Tenn., L.P. v. Riese, 284 F.3d 518, 539–40 (4th Cir. 2002)). The 
court also looked to a Georgia case where a seller’s failure to investigate the 
validity of its title amounted to an unfair trade practice. Id. (citing Regency 
Nissan, Inc. v. Taylor, 391 S.E.2d 467, 470 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990)). 
 156.  ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.551(b) (2010); CONSUMER PROTECTION UNIT, supra 
note 120, at 2. 
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attorneys general and private citizens to pursue damages.157 The Alaska 
UTPCPA formerly provided criminal as well as civil sanctions for unfair 
trade practices, and although the state was one of the first and only ones 
in the nation to do so, the criminal sanctions were removed in 1978 due 
to concerns about constitutionality.158 Part of the difficulty remains, 
however, as the attorney general can recover civil penalties from first-
time violators; other jurisdictions require a cease and desist order to be 
issued and violated first.159 
The most significant damages provisions in the Alaska UTPCPA 
involve the damages available in private actions. Under the UTPCPA 
successful plaintiffs may seek either three times the actual damages160 or 
$500 for each violation.161 Describing the purpose of treble damages in 
Alaska’s UTPCPA, the Alaska Supreme Court stated that “[t]he 
legislative history of Alaska’s provision establishes that treble damages 
were adopted not just to deter fraud, but also to encourage injured 
parties to file suits under the UTPCPA and to ensure that they would be 
adequately compensated for their efforts.”162 The statute’s language does 
not clearly indicate that a court should award treble damages to every 
successful plaintiff.163 However, in Kenai Chrysler the Alaska Supreme 
Court noted that by allowing the court to provide other relief it 
 
 157.  Lovett, supra note 7, at 740–41. 
 158.  Paula W. Gold & Robert D. Cohan, State Protection of the Consumer: 
Integration of Civil and Criminal Remedies, 12 NEW ENG. L. REV. 933, 946 (1977). The 
criminal penalties provision was found in section 45.50.551(c) of the Alaska 
Statutes but was repealed by 1978 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 166, 21. 
 159.  Gold & Cohan, supra note 158, at 936–37. 
 160.  Kenai Chrysler, 167 P.3d at 1259–60 (“[Section 45.50.531(a) of the Alaska 
Statutes] appears to authorize treble damages based solely on an allegation and 
finding that the UTPCPA has been violated. In addition to specifying that treble 
damages are to be awarded as a matter of course, subsection 531(a) goes on to 
allow the court to ‘provide other relief it considers necessary and proper’—
thereby reinforcing the provision’s intent to make treble damages automatic.” 
(quoting ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.531(a) (2010))). 
 161.  ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.531(a). 
 162. Kenai Chrysler, 167 P.3d at 1260 (citing Judiciary Committee Report on 
HCSCS for Senate Bill No. 352, ALASKA H. JOURNAL SUPP. NO. 10 AT 1, 1970 ALASKA 
H. JOURNAL 744). 
 163.  ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.531(a). Indeed, in an unreported opinion, the 
Alaska Supreme Court explicitly declared that under section 45.50.531(a) of the 
Alaska Statutes “the court is given discretion to award an amount up to treble 
damages.” Stanton v. Daly, No. S-4637, No. S-4750, 1993 WL 13563630, at *1 
(Alaska May 26, 1993). Further, this case is at least indicative that a situation 
existed where both the trial court and the Alaska Supreme Court agreed with a 
reduction from treble damages. See id. 
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considers necessary and proper, the statute “reinforc[ed] the provision’s 
intent to make treble damages automatic.”164 
In addition to treble damages, “[t]he court may provide other relief 
it considers necessary and proper,”165 which generally allows the court 
to award punitive damages.166 Under section 45.50.531(i) of the Alaska 
Statutes, fifty percent of any award of punitive damages granted under 
subsection (a) must go to the state’s general fund.167 Proponents of these 
provisions believe that they encourage private suits filed by vulnerable 
plaintiffs even when the potential windfall is very small. Opponents 
believe that along with the absence of the need to show reliance and the 
availability of class actions, defendants can be exposed to potentially 
massive liability resulting in settlements for even meritless suits.168 
C.  Attorneys’ Fees 
Typically, in the United States each party bears its own litigation 
costs, but to encourage private actions many states enable plaintiffs to 
receive attorneys’ fees if victorious in consumer protection cases.169 The 
Alaskan model of attorneys’ fees instead follows a modified version of 
the typical “English Rule,” which allows for a full recovery of attorneys’ 
fees.170 The fees are calculated under Alaska Civil Rule 82(b) as a 
percentage of the total judgment171 depending on the size of the 
 
 164.  Kenai Chrysler, 167 P.3d at 1259. Here, the court was answering whether 
punitive and treble damages could both be awarded; the fact that treble 
damages could be automatic is not clearly necessary for the decision. See id. at 
1259–60. 
 165.  ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.531(a). 
 166.  See Kenai Chrysler, 167 P.3d at 1259. 
 167.  ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.531(i). Punitive damages do not include treble 
damages, as the statute distinguishes between treble damages, which are 
automatic, and punitive damages, which fall under the category of other 
remedies in subsection (a). See Kenai Chrysler, 167 P.3d at 1260. 
 168.  See Scheuerman, supra note 14, at 38. 
 169.  Stark & Choplin, supra note 38, at 494; supra text accompanying notes 
64–67. 
 170.  See Brandon Chad Bungard, Fee! Fie! Foe! Fum!: I Smell the Efficiency of the 
English Rule: Finding the Right Approach to Tort Reform, 31 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1, 
33 n.138 (2006). For a discussion of the history of Alaska’s attorneys’ fees shifting 
law, see Susanne Di Pietro & Teresa W. Carns, Alaska’s English Rule: Attorney’s 
Fee Shifting in Civil Cases, 13 ALASKA L. REV. 33, 37–46 (1996). Alaska Rule of Civil 
Procedure 68 also presents a significant fee shifting rule, but it is beyond the 
scope of this Note. 
 171.  The judgment used to calculate damages is the net award, rather than a 
gross award, if there are counterclaims. Fairbanks Builders, Inc. v. Sandstrom 
Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 555 P.2d 964, 967 (Alaska 1976). Pre-judgment interest 
is included in the judgment award. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b)(1). Punitive damages 
are also included in calculating attorneys’ fees, but the judge can choose not to 
include punitive damages if he provides a reason. Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 
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judgment, whether the litigation was contested, and whether the case 
went to trial.172 The judge may vary the attorneys’ fees awarded if the 
judge considers the variance to be warranted based on a list of factors.173 
The initial purpose of Alaska Civil Rule 82 was “to partially 
compensate a prevailing party for the costs to which he has been put in 
the litigation in which he was involved” and not “to be used . . . as a 
vehicle for accomplishing any purpose other than providing 
compensation where it is justified.”174 However, trial courts began to use 
the imposition of attorneys’ fees for other purposes soon after Civil Rule 
82’s adoption.175 Full attorneys’ fees are appropriate when the losing 
party acted with bad faith or vexatious conduct176 or brought a frivolous 
 
627 P.2d 204, 205 (Alaska 1981); see also Di Pietro & Carns, supra note 170, at 51–
52. 
 172.  ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b)(1). In cases where the successful party does not 
receive a monetary judgment, the court awards the party thirty percent of the 
reasonable attorneys’ fees accrued. Id. at 82(b)(2). 
 173.  ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b)(3). Those factors are: 
(A) the complexity of the litigation; 
(B) the length of trial; 
(C) the reasonableness of the attorneys’ hourly rates and the number of 
hours expended; 
(D) the reasonableness of the number of attorneys used; 
(E) the attorneys’ efforts to minimize fees; 
(F) the reasonableness of the claims and defenses pursued by each side; 
(G) vexatious or bad faith conduct; 
(H) the relationship between the amount of work performed and the 
significance of the matters at stake; 
(I) the extent to which a given fee award may be so onerous to the non-
prevailing party that it would deter similarly situated litigants from the 
voluntary use of the courts; 
(J) the extent to which the fees incurred by the prevailing party suggest 
that they had been influenced by considerations apart from the case at 
bar, such as a desire to discourage claims by others against the 
prevailing party or its insurer; and 
(K) other equitable factors deemed relevant. If the court varies an 
award, the court shall explain the reasons for the variation. 
 Id. 
 174.  Preferred Gen. Agency of Alaska v. Raffetto, 391 P.2d 951, 954 (Alaska 
1964); see also Stepanov v. Gavrilovich, 594 P.2d 30, 37 (Alaska 1979); Malvo v. 
J.C. Penney Co., 512 P.2d 575, 588 (Alaska 1973); State v. Abbott, 498 P.2d 712, 
731 (Alaska 1972). 
 175.  Di Pietro & Carns, supra note 170, at 47. 
 176.  Horton v. Hansen, 722 P.2d 211, 218 (Alaska 1986) (“The award of full 
attorney’s fees is ‘manifestly unreasonable’ in the absence of a bad faith defense 
or vexatious conduct by the losing party.” (quoting Mullen v. Christiansen, 642 
P.2d 1345, 1351 (Alaska 1982))); Garrison v. Dixon, 19 P.3d 1229, 1234 (Alaska 
2001) (“We will affirm an award of full, actual attorney’s fees under Rule 82 
where the superior court finds that the losing party has engaged in vexatious or 
bad faith litigation.”). 
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suit.177 The application of Civil Rule 82 is difficult because much 
discretion remains invested in courts to vary awards by considering a 
number of complex factors.178 
Civil Rule 82 obviously influences the language of the Alaska 
UTPCPA, but plaintiffs still maintain a slight edge.179 Under section 
45.50.537 of the Alaska Statutes, a prevailing plaintiff in a UTPCPA 
claim “shall be awarded costs as provided by court rule and full 
reasonable attorney[s’] fees at the prevailing reasonable rate” instead of 
at the discounted rate provided in Alaska Civil Rule 82.180 The court, 
however, still must agree that the fees are “reasonable.”181 Similar to the 
discretion provided in Civil Rule 82,182 trial courts applying section 
45.50.537 of the Alaska Statutes maintain broad discretion over what 
constitutes “full reasonable attorneys’ fees” in light of the totality of the 
circumstances.183 Even the state gets in on the act—if the attorney 
general brings a consumer protection action on behalf of the public and 
wins, the state receives its full fees, including the costs of 
investigation.184 
Prevailing defendants, on the other hand, generally receive only the 
reduced fees from Civil Rule 82; they receive full reasonable attorney 
fees only “[i]f the action is found to be frivolous.”185 “Frivolous” is 
further defined in the Act as “not reasonably based on evidence or on 
existing law or a reasonable extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law” or “brought to harass the defendant or to cause 
unnecessary delay or needless expense.”186 In Garrison v. Dixon,187 
 
 177.  Crawford & Co. v. Vienna, 744 P.2d 1175, 1178 (Alaska 1987) (reversing 
a denial of attorneys’ fees because the suit was frivolous). 
 178.  See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82 (“(a) Allowance to Prevailing Party. Except as 
otherwise provided by law or agreed to by the parties, the prevailing party in a 
civil case shall be awarded attorney’s fees calculated under this rule.”). The 
debate over the existence and application of Rule 82 is beyond the scope of this 
Note. However, it is worth noting that, for Alaskans, the Rule may work just 
fine. 
 179.  See ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.537 (2010). 
 180.  Id. § 45.50.537(a). 
 181.  Kenai Chrysler Ctr., Inc. v. Denison, 167 P.3d 1240, 1260–61 (Alaska 
2007). 
 182.  ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b)(3). 
 183.  Kenai Chrysler, 167 P.3d at 1260–61 (upholding a superior court’s twenty 
percent reduction in attorneys’ fees despite not finding a problem with the 
hourly billing rate or the number of hours billed). In Kenai Chrysler, the plaintiffs 
argued that the standard to determine attorneys’ fees should be “whether the 
fees were reasonably incurred by the prevailing plaintiff,” but the court rejected 
this view for the broad discretion of the trial court. Id. at 1261. 
 184.  ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.537(d). 
 185.  Id. § 45.50.537(b). 
 186.  Id. § 45.50.537(e)(1–2). 
 187.  19 P.3d 1229 (Alaska 2001). 
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plaintiffs brought a claim under the UTPCPA against a competing real 
estate agent for allegedly improper advertisements.188 The court 
supported a finding that the action was frivolous because “[t]he 
[plaintiffs] never produced credible evidence that the central theme of 
the ads . . . was unfair or deceptive. They did not produce even one 
person who had read the ads and could testify to any confusion.”189 
Additionally, defendants can recover enhanced attorneys’ fees at the 
court’s discretion under Civil Rule 82.190 For instance, the court in 
Garrison supported its decision to award full attorneys’ fees to the 
defendant under Civil Rule 82 because the plaintiffs litigated the case in 
bad faith to harass a business competitor.191 
Recently, Di Pietro and Carns surveyed Anchorage trial lawyers 
about their most recent trials and found that state courts granted 
attorneys’ fees in about half of all state court trials.192 “The most frequent 
criticism of Civil Rule 82 by personal injury defense attorneys was that 
they could not collect fee awards from the losing plaintiffs.”193 
Sympathetic witnesses and deep pockets can make defendants who 
attempt to recover fees look like “ogres.”194 Moreover, some plaintiffs do 
not have the funds to pay any award, refuse to pay, or declare 
bankruptcy.195 Interestingly, the Alaska Supreme Court at one time had 
a common law “public interest litigant exception” that essentially 
ignored Civil Rule 82 for unsuccessful plaintiffs from whom extracting 
attorneys’ fees would be against the public interest, but the exemption 
was abrogated by statute in 2003.196 
 
 188.  Id. at 1230–31. 
 189.  Id. at 1235. 
 190.  See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b)(3). In Garrison, a UTPCPA action, the court 
declared, “[w]e will affirm an award of full, actual attorney’s fees under Rule 82 
where the superior court finds that the losing party has engaged in vexatious or 
bad faith litigation.” 19 P.3d at 1234. 
 191.  Garrison, 19 P.3d at 1235. 
 192.  Di Pietro & Carns, supra note 170, at 61. 
 193.  Id. at 60. 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  ALASKA STAT. § 09.60.010 (2010) (amended by § 2, 2003 Alaska Sess. Laws 
ch. 86, 2); Benjamin J. Roesch, Comment, Erie Similarities: Alaska Civil Rule 68, 
“Direct Collisions,” and the Problem of Non–Aligning Background Assumptions, 23 
ALASKA L. REV. 81, 86–87 (2006); see also Anchorage Daily News v. Anchorage 
Sch. Dist., 803 P.2d 402, 404 (Alaska 1990) (holding prevailing public interest 
litigants were entitled to full reasonable attorneys’ fees, just as in the statute); 
Anchorage v. McCabe, 568 P.2d 986, 993–94 (Alaska 1977) (no fees may be 
awarded against an unsuccessful public interest litigant), superseded by statute, 
2003 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 86. 
OQUINNWATTERSON.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2011  5:18 PM 
2011 RESHAPING THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 321 
In their survey, Di Pietro and Carns found that of the fourteen cases 
where the defendant won, only four had collected fees.197 The potential 
award of attorneys’ fees did affect post-judgment settlements, which 
was the most common reason given by attorneys for no award of 
attorneys’ fees.198 Often, the award of attorneys’ fees would be waived 
by the prevailing party in return for the losing party agreeing not to 
appeal the ruling.199 
Defendants are also restricted in terms of recovering attorneys’ fees 
from class action suits.200 In Turner v. Alaska Communications Systems 
Long Distance, Inc., the Alaska Supreme Court held that absent class 
members are generally not responsible for costs associated with the 
litigation, and a court cannot place an award for attorneys’ fees on 
them.201 Holding absent parties who remain passive throughout the 
litigation liable for fees could encourage some class members to opt out 
and leave some without a remedy.202 Defendants can still recover from 
named plaintiffs because “[the] ruling does not eliminate Civil Rule 82 
attorney[s’] fees in class actions; it simply limits Civil Rule 82’s possible 
reach to named parties . . . .”203 However, the court has also expressed 
hesitancy to award attorneys’ fees to defendants in class actions, as 
doing so might “undercut provisions meant to encourage plaintiffs to 
bring meritorious claims.”204 If Civil Rule 82 applies too rigidly then it 
may have a chilling effect on litigation that the state encourages.205 
Meanwhile, class actions cause defendants to face larger potential losses 
and higher costs than individual actions.206 While defendants see 
increased damages and litigation costs, the potential for recovery of 
 
 197.  Di Pietro & Carns, supra note 170, at 61. 
 198.  Id. at 73. 
 199.  Id. at 73–74. 
 200.  Turner v. Alaska Commc’ns Sys. Long Distance, Inc., 78 P.3d 264, 266 
(Alaska 2003). 
 201.  Id. at 270. 
 202.  Id. at 268. 
 203.  Id. at 269. 
 204.  Catalina Yachts v. Pierce, 105 P.3d 125, 131 (Alaska 2005). 
 205.  Monzingo v. Alaska Air Group, Inc., 112 P.3d 655, 667 (Alaska 2005). 
 206.  See id. at 666–67 (“Moreover, class action defendants are highly 
motivated to vigorously defend any class action. Not only are the monetary 
stakes high in most class actions, but defeat of a class action may preclude later 
claims by absent members of the putative class and can often foreclose 
devastating public relations and reputation costs for a company. Alaska Airlines 
admitted as much when arguing for enhanced attorney’s fees: ‘Faced with a 
billion dollar damages claim, a simultaneous motion to certify a 3.8 million 
member class, and expert counsel brought in from the Outside, Alaska Airlines 
was forced to respond in a proportionate manner . . . [and] expended a 
reasonable number of hours and resources given the magnitude of Plaintiff’s 
claim.’”). 
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attorneys’ fees is diminished, particularly in UTPCPA claims where state 
policy encourages plaintiffs to bring claims. 
D.  Treatment of the Federal FTC Act 
Like most states, Alaska modeled its UTPCPA after the federal FTC 
Act.207 States vary, however, in the deference that they give to the 
federal Act and to decisions issued by the FTC. The Alaska UTPCPA 
states that “[i]n interpreting [section 45.50.471 of the Alaska Statutes] due 
consideration and great weight should be given the interpretation of 15 
U.S.C. 45(a)(1) (§ 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act).”208 The 
provision was pivotal in the resolution of the previously discussed 
landmark case O’Neill Investigations.209 There, the court found that the 
FTC’s prior exercise of jurisdiction in the area of debt practices was 
entitled to great weight in the state court decision-making process.210 
The court further held that FTC consent orders shall be considered 
interpretations with “clear precedential value.”211 Alaska is the only 
state that gives FTC consent orders precedential value.212 Nevertheless, 
in Alaska federal FTC precedent remains merely persuasive and not 
mandatory in the application of the UTPCPA. 
A recent case, ASRC Energy Services Power and Communications, LLC 
v. Golden Valley Electric Association, Inc., examined the authority of FTC 
precedent when it conflicts with prior Alaska case law.213 In O’Neill 
Investigations, the court relied on an FTC decision to develop Alaska’s 
standard for unfair acts or practices.214 In ASRC, Golden Valley 
challenged the O’Neill Investigations decision because the FTC has since 
modified the standard that the court relied on in O’Neill Investigations.215 
The court looked to a similar case in Montana, which also affords “due 
 
 207.  See Scheuerman, supra note 14, at 18; Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 
8, at 3. 
 208.  ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.545 (2010) (emphasis added). 
 209.  609 P.2d 520, 529 (Alaska 1980). 
 210.  Id. 
 211.  Id.; see also Day, supra note 102, at 481. 
 212.  Jeff Sovern, Good Will Adjustment Games: An Economic and Legal Analysis 
of Secret Warranty Regulation, 60 MO. L. REV. 323, 389 (1995). 
 213.  No. S-12630, No. 6617, No. S-12989, 2011 Alas. LEXIS 118, at *24 (Alaska 
Nov. 4, 2011). 
 214.  O’Neill Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d at 529. This Note discusses the 
O’Neill Investigations standard in part II.A at the text accompanying footnotes 
146–150, supra. 
 215.  ASRC, 2011 Alas. LEXIS 118, at *28 (“[T]he 1974 legislature did not 
intend that Alaska courts would be required to abandon Alaska precedent 
where later changes in the federal approach conflicted with Alaska law.”). 
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consideration and weight” to FTC interpretations.216 The Montana court 
followed the old FTC standard while still claiming to give due 
consideration and weight to FTC interpretations.217 However, in that 
case the court noted that the FTC change placed the primary focus of the 
inquiry on substantial consumer injury.218 Montana’s standard already 
required substantial consumer injury, whereas Alaska’s standard also 
considers injury to businesses and allows for business versus business 
disputes. Consequently, the Alaska standard announced in O’Neill 
Investigations strays further from the modified FTC standard than the 
Montana standard does. 
Nevertheless, the court in ASRC found that a majority of states still 
use the old FTC standard, and therefore it inferred that using the old 
FTC standard does not conflict with the newer FTC interpretations.219 
Moreover, the court found that the due consideration and great weight 
given to FTC interpretations should not overrule Alaska precedent 
when later changes in the FTC’s approach conflict with Alaska 
precedent.220 
E.  Exempted Conduct 
Alaska exempts several notable categories of consumer transactions 
from coverage under its Act. Perhaps speaking to the importance of land 
and the care required in its transfer, all transactions in real property are 
exempted from the statute.221 Alaska is one of only seven states that has 
both a “general” exemption and “specific” exemptions in its statute.222 In 
the “general” exemption, the statute exempts prosecution under the Act 
itself for all conduct “regulated” under any state or federal law; Alaska is 
one of only two states that go that far in their exemptions.223 The Act has 
 
 216.  Id. at *32–33 (citing Rohrer v. Knudson, 203 P.3d 759 (Mont. 2009)). 
 217.  Rohrer, 203 P.3d at 763–64. 
 218.  Id. at 763 n.1. 
 219.  ASRC, 2011 Alas. LEXIS 118, at *30–31. 
 220.  Id. at *28. 
 221.  See State v. First Nat’l Bank of Anchorage, 660 P.2d 406, 414 (Alaska 
1982); see also Nehf, supra note 96, at 65–67 (although there was no express 
prohibition on including transfers of real property under the Act, the court 
found that the provisions of the Act dealt with goods and services only, and not 
the overall “conduct of trade or commerce”). 
 222.  Scott Thomas O’Neal, Exempting the Protection Out of Michigan’s 
Consumer Protection Act: A Call for Returning Consumer Protection to the Act, 84 U. 
DET. MERCY L. REV. 237, 252–53 (2007). The other states are Florida, Idaho, 
Illinois, Michigan, Virginia, and Washington. Id. at 252. 
 223.  Schwartz, Silverman & Appel, supra note 128, at 105. The other state is 
Oklahoma. Id. The general exemption appears in section 45.50.481(a)(1) of the 
Alaska Statutes. Critics have argued that exempting any conduct plausibly 
“regulated” under law makes the exemption impossibly broad. See O’Neal, supra 
OQUINNWATTERSON.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2011  5:18 PM 
324 ALASKA LAW REVIEW VOL. 28:2 
“specific” exemptions as well that explicitly exempt certain industries, 
most notably the insurance industry.224 The result is that insurance 
policyholders typically do not have private rights of action against 
insurance companies under the Act; these claims are dealt with through 
other aspects of state law. Finally, Alaska’s statutes and courts have 
been oddly silent over whether Alaska exempts licensed professionals 
from the Act, as many other states do.225 Presumably, claims filed under 
the UTPCPA would skyrocket if doctors, lawyers, accountants, and 
other such professionals were subject to the heightened damages awards 
and lower standard of proof of the UTPCPA. The Alaska Supreme Court 
has chosen not to reach this issue in several cases.226 
F.  Unique Business-Related Causes of Action 
The UTPCPA is a useful tool not only for consumer plaintiffs, but 
increasingly for business plaintiffs as well, particularly small businesses. 
The “unfair trade practices” portions of the statute are perhaps best fit 
for businesses, but the decision in Alaska to lump the unfair competition 
and consumer protection laws into one statute has resulted in a blurring 
of the actions. It is clear today that in Alaska a business can sue another 
business under the UTPCPA, though this is not explicit in the statute. 
The statute also clearly covers traditional unfair competition practices 
such as “passing off” and misrepresentation.227 In addition, businesses 
can and should take advantage of the Act’s provisions that prevent 
trademark dilution, misappropriation of trade dress, and injury to 
 
note 222, at 239. The Alaska Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted unfair acts 
as exempt only when the business is regulated and the unfair acts are somehow 
prohibited under other law, basically deferring to the other statute’s penalties. 
Matanuska Maid, Inc. v. State, 620 P.2d 182, 186 (Alaska 1980). 
 224.  See O’Neal, supra note 222, at 253 (citing O.K. Lumber Co. v. Providence 
Washington Ins. Co., 759 P.2d 523, 528 (Alaska 1988)). 
 225.  See Bauer, supra note 14, at 155. 
 226.  See, e.g., Yukon-Koyukuk Sch. Dist. v. Arneson, No. 3AN–01–3791 CI, 
2002 WL 34119570, at *6 (Alaska Super. Ct. Dec. 2002). 
 227.  ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471(b)(1–2) (2010). Passing off and 
misrepresentation are distinct but related theories of unfair competition that 
form the basis of modern trademark law. Passing off involves the literal 
presentation of goods in the market and “passing them off” as those of another. 
It is based in traditional ideas of fraud and deceit. Misappropriation as a tort 
relates to misuse of “intangible” investments made by others. Modern-day 
applications include rights of publicity and trade secrets. See David L. Lange, The 
Intellectual Property Clause in Contemporary Trademark Law: An Appreciation of Two 
Recent Essays and Some Thoughts about Why We Ought to Care, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 213, 220–21 (1996). 
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reputation.228 These actions present additional enforcement possibilities 
when considered in conjunction with federal protection under Section 
43(a) of the Lanham Act or Alaska’s common law of trademarks. 
Business actions become more complicated and controversial if the 
business plaintiff sues under a theory of consumer protection rather 
than a theory of unfair competition.229 Such actions were found to be 
legal in Western Star Trucks, Inc. v. Big Iron Equipment Service, Inc.,230 
based on the premises that the UTPCPA is a remedial statute that must 
be interpreted broadly and that legislative history showed that private 
rights of action were intended to protect not only consumers but also 
“honest businessmen.”231 
The Alaska court system again upheld a business versus business 
action in the recent case ASRC Energy Services Power and Communications, 
LLC v. Golden Valley Electric Association, Inc.232 In that case, a contractor 
sued an electric utility over contract disputes arising out of the 
contractor’s requests for additional compensation.233 The contractor 
amended its complaint, claiming that the utility had misrepresented 
technical data about the project and failed to disclose details about the 
construction that may have led to delays.234 Included in the amended 
complaint was a UTPCPA claim.235 As the litigation proceeded, the 
utility added UTPCPA counterclaims asserting that the contractor had 
violated the Act by falsifying the documents supporting the requests for 
additional compensation.236 Both sets of claims were eventually 
presented to the jury, even though both parties (and the trial court) 
struggled to define what acts constituted “unfair or deceptive” practices 
under the UTPCPA.237 
The full impact that this new context for consumer protection 
litigation could have on Alaska courts and businesses has yet to be 
determined, and it is a focus of this Note in Parts III and IV. 
 
 228.  See Mitchell M. Wong, Note, Aesthetic Functionality Doctrine and the Law 
of Trade–Dress Protection, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1116, 1129 n.64 (1998) (citing 
ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.50.180, 45.50.471(b)(1, 3, 4, 7, 11), 45.50.531(a) (2010)). 
 229.  See Parts III–IV, infra. 
 230.  101 P.3d 1047 (Alaska 2004). 
 231.  Id. at 1050–54. 
 232.  No. S-12630, No. 6617, No. S-12989, 2011 Alas. LEXIS 118 (Alaska Nov. 4, 
2011). 
 233.  Id. at *3–6. 
 234.  Id. at *6. 
 235.  Id. 
 236.  Id. at *7. 
 237.  Id. at *9–10.  This case will be further discussed in Parts III and IV, infra. 
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III. PROBLEMS IN APPLICATION: FRANKENSTEIN’S MONSTER 
ATTACKS 
For all the benefits that consumer protection acts provide to society, 
there is also little question that they have morphed far beyond what the 
legislatures ever intended.238 The Alaska UTPCPA is no exception. This 
part of the Note outlines four major problems with the Act: (1) 
subjecting defendants to punishment without culpability, (2) lacking a 
requirement to show reliance, (3) handling of attorneys’ fees; and (4) 
allowing business versus business and business versus consumer 
actions. Proposed solutions to these problems appear in Part IV. 
Critics have identified generalized weaknesses in CPA structure. 
Several commentators have concluded that CPAs put significant strain 
on the judicial system without offsetting gains in real consumer 
protection.239 Part of the strain comes from uneven application; there is 
substantial variance in how CPAs are written and how they are 
interpreted nationwide.240 This creates forum shopping and hinders 
attempts to unify state laws and certify multistate class actions.241 The 
statutes are too broad and assume “judicious exercise of discretion”—
which some commentators assert simply is absent.242 Alaska’s Act is no 
exception. While many consumers have found justice through UTPCPA 
actions, some consumers and many businesses have found frustration. 
 
 238.  See J.R. Franke & D.A. Ballam, New Applications of Consumer Protection 
Law: Judicial Activism or Legislative Directive?, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 347, 347 
(1992). 
 239.  Henry N. Butler & Joshua D. Wright, Are State Consumer Protection Acts 
Really Little–FTC Acts?, 63 FLA. L. REV. 163, 166 (2011); see also Henry N. Butler & 
Jason S. Johnson, Reforming State Consumer Protection Liability: An Economic 
Approach, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 7 (2010) (“[A]ccording to leaders of the tort 
reform movement, this massive upsurge in state CPA litigation does not reflect 
some new wave of false and deceptive consumer marketing practices. Rather it 
is a tide of, at best, highly doubtful claims brought by private class action 
attorneys seeking a big payday, a tide of litigation that is symptomatic of a 
broader litigation crisis. Overly broad judicial interpretation of state CPAs has 
long been of concern to commentators, and economic criticism of judicial 
expansion as to what constitutes actionable conduct under CPAs has become 
increasingly intense.”). 
 240.  Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 8, at 17. 
 241.  Id. 
 242.  Sovern, supra note 25, at 467; see also Norton, supra note 114, at 644–45 
(broad and vague CPA statutes and lack of procedural protections can lead to 
defendants being punished for conduct not clearly unlawful). 
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A.  Punishment Without Culpability 
As previously mentioned, the lower burdens of proof, treble 
damages, and attorneys’ fees provided in the Act make it an attractive 
tool for prospective plaintiffs. Automatic treble damages in particular 
are a buzz saw for a defendant encountering a suit because the higher 
damages award does not rest on any sort of culpable conduct. The 
chance of an unfavorable result tripling an already large liability 
dramatically changes the expected losses for the defendant, even if the 
plaintiff has a meritless case.243 When defendants are likely to face 
paying high damages whether their conduct was culpable or not, then 
they have less incentive to refrain from culpable conduct.244 
Even a business that carefully follows every regulation could be 
exposed to massive liability if any part of its advertising or product 
labeling is determined to have had the slightest capacity to deceive.245 A 
state may be able to crow about a big money verdict while the corporate 
defendant bears it in the short term; however, after one too many days 
in the courthouse, the business may ultimately decide it is no longer 
worthwhile to do business in the state.246 Thus, in the end certain 
consumer victories may not be in the true public interest at all.247 
Increased damages awards also distort settlement amounts. A 
defendant who believes he has a meritorious defense may still settle. 
The Alaska UTPCPA provides treble damages automatically,248 so the 
risk of a high damages award may induce settlement from defendants 
who would have otherwise won at trial.249 At the same time, the 
incentives for plaintiffs are reversed; increased damages create the 
possibility of a windfall settlement for a non-meritorious claim. 
Recent examples in Alaska illustrate these issues. First, an actuarial 
firm incorrectly estimated rising healthcare costs for a state pension, 
 
 243.  Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 8, at 33–34. 
 244.  See Butler & Wright, supra note 239, at 65. 
 245.  State v. O’Neill Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d 520, 534–35 (Alaska 1980); 
Schwartz, Silverman & Appel, supra note 128, at 95. 
 246.  See Sovern, supra note 212, at 402 (providing the example of automobile 
companies readily offering “secret” free warranty programs to fix car problems 
to restore and enhance goodwill only until states passed legislation mandating it 
for all citizens on consumer protection grounds). 
 247.  Sovern, supra note 25, at 437. 
 248.   Kenai Chrysler Ctr., Inc. v. Denison, 167 P.3d 1240, 1259–60 (Alaska 
2007) (“[Section 45.50.531(a) of the Alaska Statutes] appears to authorize treble 
damages based solely on an allegation and finding that the UTPCPA has been 
violated.”); see also supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
 249.  See Butler & Wright, supra note 239, at 65. 
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resulting in a nearly $2 billion shortfall for the pension.250 The state sued 
partially under the UTPCPA, and the automatic treble damages 
increased the risk of trial for the firm. The actuarial firm was sued for 
$2.8 billion, and it quickly settled with the state for $500 million.251 
Another action created a deterrent effect but was unevenly enforced: In 
2009 two souvenir shops in Juneau targeting cruise ship tourists with 
huge discount sale signs outside their shops were sued by the state for 
unfair trade practices based on false advertising.252 One jewelry store 
owner was fined $50,000, but cried foul since he was targeted and 
dozens of others on the streets nearby were not.253 The deterrence 
seemed to work, as far fewer signs were seen the next tourist season, but 
at a cost: many retailers said sales were down because there was nothing 
to herd tourists into the stores.254 
B. No Reliance 
In order to encourage consumer protection suits and to deter fraud, 
many jurisdictions eliminate the requirement for plaintiffs in consumer 
protection suits to show reliance on a misrepresentation either as an 
element of the tort or as a part of causation.255 Without a requirement for 
plaintiffs to show reliance, defendants can be liable for damages due to 
misrepresentations on which no one relied and that did no actual 
harm.256 Further, without a requirement of reliance and causation, 
defendants can be liable to all consumers of a good or service, not just 
the victims; as a result potential defendants are over deterred from 
activity.257 Plaintiffs—both businesses and consumers alike—have an 
incentive to attempt to classify almost any claim as a consumer 
protection violation because the lack of a reliance requirement makes the 
claim easier to prove. As a result, cases that should be a simple breach of 
 
 250.  Pat Forgey, Alaska’s Pension Suit Settled for $500M, JUNEAU EMPIRE, Jun. 
13, 2010, available at 
http://www.juneauempire.com/stories/061310/sta_653072396.shtml. 
 251.  Id. 
 252.  Kim Marquis, State Pursues Businesses with Bogus “Sale” Ads, JUNEAU 
EMPIRE, Sept. 9, 2009, available at 
http://www.juneauempire.com/stories/090909/loc_491251093.shtml. 
 253.  Id. 
 254.  Kim Marquis, “Sale” Signs Less Prevalent in Tourist District, JUNEAU 
EMPIRE, May 14, 2010, available at 
http://www.juneauempire.com/stories/051410/loc_638917941.shtml. 
 255.  See Scheuerman, supra note 14, at 20, 30–31. 
 256.  Id. at 31–32. 
 257.  Id. at 39. 
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contract claim between businesses258 become consumer protection 
actions. 
Claims under the UTPCPA do not require a showing of reliance; 
“[a]ll that is required is a showing that the acts and practices were 
capable of being interpreted in a misleading way.”259 In Odom v. 
Fairbanks Memorial Hospital, the Alaska Supreme Court overturned a 
hospital’s motion to dismiss a former employee’s claims, including a 
UTPCPA claim, and held that a plaintiff does not even have to show an 
injury.260 However, just one year after Odom, the Alaska Supreme Court 
found in Garrison v. Dixon261 that a claim sufficient to survive a motion to 
dismiss under the standard expressed in Odom failed on summary 
judgment.262 The Alaska Supreme Court specifically noted that the 
plaintiff’s UTPCPA claim failed because a plaintiff must show an 
ascertainable loss of money or property as a result of the UTPCPA 
violation.263 
C. Attorneys’ Fees 
Another problem in applying the UTPCPA lies in the attorneys’ fee 
shifting provisions described in Part II. From one side, the threat of a 
defendant obtaining even partial attorneys’ fees may cause plaintiffs not 
to bring meritorious claims.264 Access to the courts and justice system is 
a major concern regarding Civil Rule 82 overall, in particular when the 
purpose of the statute is to encourage consumers to bring claims.265 As 
one commentator has described the English Rule on attorneys’ fees: 
“middle class and rich consumers are the usual beneficiaries of these 
statutes. The poor consumer seems protected only marginally.”266 
Alternatively, although successful defendants are entitled to 
recover attorneys’ fees, they are much less likely to collect on the award 
than successful plaintiffs. If the court does not find the action frivolous, 
then the defendant must submit a motion for attorneys’ fees.267 The 
 
 258.  See W. Star Trucks, Inc. v. Big Iron Equip. Serv., Inc., 101 P.3d 1047, 1049 
(Alaska 2004); see also supra notes 227–237 and accompanying text. 
 259.  Odom v. Fairbanks Memorial Hosp., 999 P.2d 123, 132 (Alaska 2000) 
(quoting State v. O’Neill Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d 520, 534–35 (Alaska 1980)). 
 260.  Id. at 132–33. 
 261.  19 P.3d 1229 (Alaska 2001). 
 262.  Id. at 1236. 
 263.  Id. at 1235 n.22. 
 264.  Stark & Choplin, supra note 38, at 508–11. 
 265.  See Catalina Yachts v. Pierce, 105 P.3d 125, 131 (Alaska 2005). 
 266.  Stewart Macaulay, Address, Bambi Meets Godzilla: Reflections on Contracts 
Scholarship and Teaching v. State Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer 
Protection Statutes, 26 HOUS. L. REV. 575, 586 (1989). 
 267.  ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.537(b) (2010). 
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courts have already expressed hesitancy about imposing awards of 
attorneys’ fees against plaintiffs when statutory purposes promote 
litigation in that area.268 While plaintiffs automatically receive full 
attorneys’ fees under the UTPCPA, defendants can normally only be 
awarded reduced fees under Civil Rule 82. 
Even when defendants win an award of attorneys’ fees, they may 
never be able to collect the fees. In the events leading to Compton v. 
Kittleson,269 Kittleson represented the Nelvises as plaintiffs in a UTPCPA 
claim.270 The defendants in that UTPCPA claim offered to settle the 
claim for $25,000, but the Nelvises rejected the claim due to a fee 
arrangement that would have left them with only $3,000271 and the 
possibility of receiving treble damages and full reasonable attorneys’ 
fees under the UTPCPA.272 The Nelvises lost on all counts in the 
UTPCPA trial, and the court awarded the defendants almost $100,000 in 
attorneys’ fees.273 That award, however, did not go directly to the 
defendants because the Nelvises declared bankruptcy.274 
D. Business Actions 
The most alarming faults of the UTPCPA have been revealed since 
Western Star Trucks, Inc. v. Big Iron Equipment Service, Inc., in which one 
business was permitted to sue another on grounds of consumer 
protection rather than unfair competition.275 Commentators on both 
sides of the issue have debated the merits of allowing businesses to act 
as de facto consumers for decades, with some calling for a “blurring of 
the line between consumers and businesses”276 and, at the extreme, 
granting businesses the right to litigate any and all disputes arising from 
even the most routine and ordinary commercial transactions.277 
 
 268.  See Catalina Yachts, 105 P.3d at 131. 
 269.  171 P.3d 172 (Alaska 2007). Compton is a case where the plaintiffs sued 
an attorney for malpractice after they lost a UTPCPA claim. Id. 
 270.  Id. at 173. 
 271.  Id. at 174–75. Subsequent to adopting the fee arrangement but prior to 
the settlement, a federal bankruptcy judge criticized a similar fee arrangement 
and an informal ethics opinion ruled the fee arrangement likely put 
impermissible pressure on clients to reject plea offers. Id. 
 272.  Id. at 175. 
 273.  Id. The fee was awarded under Alaska Civil Rule 68, which provides 
attorneys’ fees as a result of the losing party rejecting a settlement offer. Id. 
 274.  See id. 
 275.  101 P.3d 1047, 1050–54 (Alaska 2004). 
 276.  See Michael Flynn & Karen Slater, All We Are Saying is Give Business a 
Chance: The Application of State UDAP Statutes to Business–to–Business 
Transactions, 15 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 81, 84, 87 (2003). 
 277.  Note, Toward Greater Equality in Business Transactions: A Proposal to 
Extend the Little FTC Acts to Small Businesses, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1621, 1623 (1983). 
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Although many businesses in this country are small and giving 
businesses private rights as “consumers” would provide Main Street 
Mom ‘n’ Pop stores with more protection,278 the rights of larger firms 
must be considered as well. Many businesses have argued that the 
increasingly “creative” actions brought under state CPAs are abusive 
and that courts are overstepping their statutory authority.279 Even those 
favoring business actions admit that it is at best “a form of consumer 
protection one step removed”280 and that the lowered standards of proof, 
along with treble and punitive damages provisions, provide incentives 
to bring claims of little merit.281 In 1972 Massachusetts became the first 
state to permit business versus business actions under its CPA.282 Texas 
followed in the next few years.283 Texas allows any business with assets 
under $25 million to sue another as a consumer, not just for unfair 
competition.284 Business versus business actions are best facilitated by 
states with catch-all provisions like Alaska’s;285 however, many of these 
states have struggled after authorizing the actions with uneven 
application.286 Whether or not a state allows business versus business 
actions depends on its interpretation of certain definitions; all CPAs 
define those who can sue as “persons” or “consumers,” and how courts 
interpret those terms determines the issue.287 Unfortunately, legislative 
history is lacking for many state CPAs, including the UTPCPA, because 
most of them were hastily passed based on model acts.288 
The reasoning in Western Star Trucks demonstrates that the plain 
language of the UTPCPA supports business versus business actions 
 
 278.  Id. at 1629–30; Flynn & Slater, supra note 276, at 87. 
 279.  Franke & Ballam, supra note 238, at 348 (citing Wayne E. Green, Lawyers 
Give Deceptive Trade Statutes New Day in Court, Wider Interpretations, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 24, 1990, at B1). 
 280.  Note, supra note 277, at 1632 (emphasis added) (quoting David F. Bragg, 
Now We’re All Consumers – The 1975 Amendments to the Consumer Protection Act, 
28 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 8 (1976)). 
 281.  Id. at 1639. 
 282.  Michael C. Gilleran & L. Seth Stadfeld, Little FTC Acts Emerge in Business 
Litigation, 72 A.B.A. J. 58 (1986). 
 283.  Franke & Ballam, supra note 238, at 414. 
 284.  Macaulay, supra note 266, at 587 (citing TEX. BUS. COM. CODE ANN. § 
17.45 (Vernon 1987)). 
 285.  Franke & Ballam, supra note 238, at 423. 
 286.  See Flynn & Slater, supra note 276, at 93–97 (stating that Florida courts 
have struggled with inconsistent precedent since authorizing business versus 
business actions); Sovern, supra note 25, at 463 (describing how increased usage 
of the Texas act in the wake of authorizing business versus business actions 
helped expose many problems; the statute had to be amended eight times in 
fifteen years). 
 287.  Flynn & Slater, supra note 276, at 87. 
 288.  See Kaplan & Smith, supra note 28, at 277 n.114. 
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under a theory of consumer protection,289 but the court admitted that 
dicta in prior case law and holdings in two of its prior cases did not 
support such a theory.290 The court appealed to plain language and 
legislative history arguments, stating that the act applies to any acts “in 
the conduct of trade or commerce”291 and that it was “based on 
legislation developed in large part by the Federal Trade Commission, 
[and] is designed to meet the increasing need in Alaska for the 
protection of consumers as well as honest businessmen from the 
depredations of those persons employing unfair or deceptive trade 
practices.”292 There is a problem with this line of analysis: honest 
businessmen were indeed meant to be protected under the Act—not 
under a consumer protection theory, but rather under an unfair 
competition theory. 
The Alaska court is not alone in its confusion; courts throughout 
the country have lost track of the difference between unfair competition 
and consumer protection, partly because so many states have lumped 
both theories together in one statute.293 The ideological underpinnings of 
the FTC and “Little FTC Acts” have been pegged as being progressive in 
origin—to rectify uneven bargaining power between consumers and 
monopolistic large corporations.294 If two companies are so uneven in 
bargaining that the lesser needs protection like a consumer, then 
perhaps the action is appropriate, but how often does this happen?295 
Take, for example, the fact pattern in Western Star Trucks: Western Star 
Trucks, Inc. breached an oral agreement that it had with a supplier, Big 
Iron Equipment Service, Inc. Big Iron Equipment relied on the 
 
 289.  101 P.3d 1047, 1049–54 (Alaska 2004). 
 290.  Id. at 1047–48, 1050–51 (citing State v. First Nat’l Bank of Anchorage, 660 
P.2d 406 (Alaska 1982); Aloha Lumber Corp. v. Univ. of Alaska, 994 P.2d 991 
(Alaska 1999)). 
 291.  Id. at 1050 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471(a) (2010)). 
 292.  Id. at 1052 (emphasis in original) (quoting Judiciary Committee Report on 
HCSCS for Senate Bill No. 352, ALASKA H. JOURNAL SUPP. NO. 10 AT 1, 1970 ALASKA 
H. JOURNAL 744). 
 293.  See Staci Zaretsky, Note, Trademark Law and Consumer Protection Law – 
Deception is a Cruel Act: “Uniform” State Deceptive Trade Practices Acts and Their 
Deceptive Effects on the Trademark Claims of Corporate Competitors, 32 W. NEW ENG. 
L. REV. 549, 593 (2010). 
 294.  Prentiss Cox, Goliath Has the Slingshot: Public Benefit and Private 
Enforcement of Minnesota Consumer Protection Laws, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 163, 
174–76 (2006). 
 295.  See Zaretsky, supra note 293, at 574. Moreover, the Alaska Supreme 
Court recently noted that “nowhere in Western Star did we suggest that relative 
power influenced our decision.” ASRC Energy Servs. Power and Commc’ns, 
LLC v. Golden Valley Elec. Ass’n, Inc., No. S-12630, No. 6617, No. S-12989, 2011 
Alas. LEXIS 118, at *39 (Alaska Nov. 4, 2011). 
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contract.296 Western Star Trucks did not dispute the agreement had been 
breached, but Big Iron Equipment sued (and won) in the lower court 
based on the UTPCPA and thus was awarded treble damages for a 
simple breach of contract claim.297 Once the Alaska Supreme Court 
affirmed, the game was on: business versus business actions were 
permitted.298 It is difficult to conceive of an action that a business could 
bring against another business in Alaska that does not already fit under 
another cause of action. False advertising or trademark dilution? 
Businesses (not consumers) have redress under the federal Lanham 
Act.299 Supplier reneged on a promise of goods? Such injuries are breach 
of contract claims with typical reliance requirements and typical 
damages, not trumped up “consumer protection” torts. The extent of the 
damage in Alaska wrought by this misinterpretation of the statute 
remains unclear, but a warning shot has already been fired: in 2005, an 
action brought under the UTPCPA by a business survived the summary 
judgment stage again, but this time, it was against a consumer.300 The 
court reasoned that O’Neill Investigations demanded a liberal 
interpretation of the statute, and thus all the defendants had to do was 
show any “ascertainable loss” suffered in the course of “trade or 
commerce.”301 
The O’Neill Investigations standard was again applied in a business 
action in the 2011 case ASRC Energy Services Power and Communications, 
LLC v. Golden Valley Electric Association, Inc.302 What began as a contract 
dispute between two businesses resulted in both parties adding 
UTPCPA claims.303 The jury found that ASRC breached its contract and 
violated the UTPCPA.304 However, the jury also attributed all of Golden 
 
 296.  Id. 
 297.  Id. 
 298.  See id. at 1054. 
 299.  See Dayle L. Wallien, The Unfair Trade Practice of False Advertising, ITEMS 
OF INT. (2005), available at http://www.alaskalaw.com/falseadv.htm. 
 300.  Corneliussen v. Bridgestone/Firestone North Am. Tire LLC, No. 3AN-
03-03558CI, 2005 WL 6399469, at *11–12 (Alaska Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 2005). 
However, summary judgment in Alaskan courts is a stricter standard than in 
federal courts. See Meyer v. State of Alaska, Dep’t of Revenue, 994 P.2d 365, 368 
(Alaska 1999). For instance, when a positive paternity test established a 99.98% 
probability that the defendant was the father, a simple statement by the 
defendant that he did not have intercourse with the plaintiff created a triable 
issue of fact, and the Alaska Supreme Court overturned the trial court’s grant of 
summary judgment. Id. 
 301.  Corneliussen, 2005 WL 6399469, at *11–12. 
 302.  No. S-12630, No. 6617, No. S-12989, 2011 Alas. LEXIS 118 (Alaska Nov. 4, 
2011); see also notes 232–237, supra, and accompanying text. 
 303.  ASRC, 2011 Alas. LEXIS 118, at *6–7. 
 304.  Id. at *10. 
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Valley’s damages305 to the UTPCPA violations, meaning the damages 
would treble in addition to Golden Valley receiving attorneys’ fees.306 As 
a result of expanding the UTPCPA to business versus business disputes, 
what should have been a typical contract dispute resulted in competing 
UTPCPA claims, along with their reduced standards and enhanced 
damages. Nevertheless, the court strongly upheld the viability of 
business versus business actions from Western Star Trucks.307 
Where are the limits? Can a fast food restaurant be sued for making 
a mistake on a drive-thru order? For making someone fat? Similar 
actions are actually happening across the United States based on statutes 
like Alaska’s.308 Moreover, how long will it be before businesses begin to 
reframe any contract dispute as a consumer protection action? 
IV. PUTTING THE HORSE BACK IN THE BARN: PROPOSED 
REVISIONS TO THE ACT 
As a result of the problems discussed in Part III, the UTPCPA is 
being used to assert novel causes of action not by consumers who have 
been legitimately wronged, but by schemers targeting deep-pocketed 
companies and unpopular defendants who will settle rather than 
litigate.309 Given the liberal reading O’Neill Investigations allows,310 the 
Alaska Supreme Court is unlikely to limit the application of the 
UTPCPA; thus, the best hope for reform will be from statutory revisions 
and clarifications. Alaska, like many other states, has now seen liability 
or threat thereof created where none existed previously.311 Businesses 
are now using the UTPCPA to sue competitors and other 
unsophisticated smaller businesses as corporate retaliation for breach of 
contract or misrepresentation that should be regulated through other 
channels.312 
 
 305.  The jury initially awarded Golden Valley damages arising from 
responding to the false claims during the litigation, but the Alaska Supreme Court 
reversed those portions of the damages award. Id. at *28–29. 
 306.  Id. at *10–15. 
 307.  Id. at *36–40 (citing W. Star Trucks, Inc. v. Big Iron Equip. Serv., Inc., 101 
P.3d 1047, 1050–54 (Alaska 2004)). 
 308.  See, e.g., Parham v. McDonalds Corp., No. CGC-10-506178 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. filed Dec. 15, 2010) (class action suit brought under consumer protection laws 
against McDonalds because they include toys in children’s “Happy Meals”). 
 309.  Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 8, at 37. 
 310.  See Corneliussen v. Bridgestone/Firestone North Am. Tire LLC, No. 
3AN-03-03558CI, 2005 WL 6399469, at *11–12 (Alaska Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 2005). 
 311.  Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 8, at 3–4. 
 312.  See id. 
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As the Western Star Trucks court alluded, Alaska’s UTPCPA is 
intended to protect honest businessmen313—just not quite in the way the 
court suggested. The nature of the protection that an honest 
businessman should receive through CPAs is grounded in unfair 
competition, not consumer protection. The harmed business should 
have a right to regain sales lost from customers who were induced to 
buy from a dishonest merchant.314 The honest businessman should have 
no action for, say, an allegedly deceptive sale sign posted by a 
competitor. Perhaps he may have a right under the federal Lanham Act, 
particularly if there was co-opting, infringement, or other mark 
misrepresentation, but he should have few if any unique rights in state 
courts under the guise of “consumer protection.”315 Furthermore, Alaska 
has robust state law trademark protection that may cover these cases in 
the absence of new causes of action under the UTPCPA.316 
Constant creation of new causes of action also betrays the 
UTPCPA’s supposed reliance on and deference to the federal FTC Act. If 
a business diligently followed the regulations of the FTC or other federal 
agencies in developing marketing, it should reasonably expect not to be 
hauled into court under a state law that mimics much of the language 
and all of the same policy goals.317 Some of these problems would be 
alleviated in Alaska if the legislature made a few relatively simple 
changes to the text of the Act. The UTPCPA provides plaintiffs with a 
lower burden of proof through the absence of showing reliance, 
automatic increased damages, full attorneys’ fees if they win, and a low 
likelihood of actually paying attorneys’ fees if they lose. The 
combination of these incentives encourages plaintiffs to find creative 
ways to classify their actions as UTPCPA violations. Cabining at least 
some of these incentives would reduce the abuse of the UTPCPA. 
The Alaska Supreme Court could limit creations of new actions 
under the UTPCPA by building on the requirement expressed in 
Garrison v. Dixon: that a plaintiff suffer an ascertainable loss of money or 
property as a result of another person’s act or practice that violated the 
UTPCPA. The courts could require a plaintiff to demonstrate loss 
resulting from reliance on a misleading advertisement or statement. 
Adding an element of reliance to the ascertainable loss of money 
 
 313.  101 P.3d 1047, 1052–54 (Alaska 2004). 
 314.  Gold & Cohan, supra note 158, at 954. 
 315.  See Zaretsky, supra note 293, at 565–66. 
 316.  See ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.50.10–45.50.205 (2010); see also Filing an Alaska 
State Trademark, ALASKA DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CMTY. & ECON. DEV., 
http://www.dced.state.ak.us/bsc/tmark.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2011) 
(describing registration of trademarks in Alaska). 
 317.  Schwartz, Silverman & Appel, supra note 128, at 104. 
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requirement would prevent artful pleading from turning contract claims 
between businesses into UTPCPA claims. 
The UTPCPA explicitly defines only twelve terms, and merely 
three of those could be considered broadly relevant: “consumer,” 
“goods or services,” and “advertising.”318 The best way to tighten the 
belt on undesirable business versus business and business versus 
consumer actions is by tweaking the definitions of “consumer” and 
“goods and services,” as those changes will have direct effects on 
standing. This idea has precedent, as many states did the opposite in 
order to expand these actions. If these actions are desired, then it should 
say so explicitly in the statute. Alaska is one of only four states that 
neither includes nor excludes businesses in its definitions of “consumer” 
and “person.”319 Further, Alaska uses “person” in its definition of 
“consumer” but does not define “person” for the purposes of the Act.320 
By defining person as “a private citizen of Alaska,” the Act could limit 
businesses’ standing in consumer protection actions. Alternatively the 
legislature could supplement the definitions of “consumer” and “goods 
or services” by clarifying that consumer transactions covered by the Act 
are “primarily intended for personal, family, or household use.”321 
When Massachusetts wanted to include business versus consumer 
actions, it did the opposite, expanding its definition of “trade and 
commerce” to include essentially any business transaction.322 Similarly, 
North Carolina expanded its definition of “commerce” to include “all 
business activities, however denominated.”323 Other states have limited 
actions to things like franchise agreements and agricultural 
transactions.324 Although the UTPCPA needs to be broad in order to be 
flexible, courts need help with terms like these to ensure even 
application. 
A similar clarification effort would help in the area of exemptions. 
If state agencies seem confused about what constitutes regulated and 
exempt conduct, how should private citizens looking to bring actions be 
expected to know?325 Licensed professional exemptions are a realm 
 
 318.  ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.561(a)(1–12) (2010). The defined terms are 
advertising, cemetery lot, chain distributor scheme, consumer, dealing in 
hearing aids, documentary material, examination of documentary material, 
fresh, goods or services, hearing aid, knowingly, and seconds. Id. 
 319.  Flynn & Slater, supra note 276, at 88 n.48. 
 320.  ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.561(a)(4) (2010) (“‘[C]onsumer’ means a person 
who seeks or acquires goods or services by lease or purchase.”). 
 321.  Dunbar, supra note 116, at 458. 
 322.  Franke & Ballam, supra note 238, at 384. 
 323.  Id. at 399; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75–1.1(b) (2010). 
 324.  Note, supra note 277, at 1635–36. 
 325.  See Schwartz, Silverman & Appel, supra note 128, at 101. 
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where the Act is silent but clarification is desperately needed. As tort 
reform gains momentum nationwide, CPAs may well be the only way in 
the future to seek restitution from licensed professionals.326 There is 
currently no exemption on the books in the UTPCPA, but state courts 
have also noted that this is not a settled issue. In Yukon-Koyukuk School 
District v. Arneson,327 a school district filed UTPCPA claims against an 
attorney who had failed to provide promised services; the attorney 
claimed that he should be exempt as a licensed professional regulated 
by other bodies.328 The court dismissed the UTPCPA claims on other 
grounds and stated there was no need to reach the question of licensed 
professional exemption.329 While this demonstrated judicial restraint, the 
court left open a question that now should be answered definitively. 
Perhaps one option is to look to the FTC Act, which contains no such 
exemption of any kind.330 
A final change that would help smooth out implementation of the 
Act would be to change the FTC Act from “guiding” authority worthy of 
“great weight,” as it currently stands,331 to the greatest weight: making it 
mandatory. In other states that have considered the same question, 
commentators have concluded that without making the FTC 
interpretations, consent orders, regulations, and decisions all 
mandatory, a substantial defect results.332 If prospective defendants are 
supposed to know the law and federal decisions are not “law,” but still 
can be used convincingly against them, how can they be fairly charged 
under a state CPA for violating a federal standard?333 Incorporating the 
FTC Act into state law would alleviate this problem.334 
The Alaska Supreme Court has already referenced one distinction 
between the FTC Act and Alaska precedent.335 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) codified 
changes to the FTC’s definition of what constitutes an unfair act or 
 
 326.  Bauer, supra note 14, at 131. 
 327.  No. 3AN-01-3791 CI, 2002 WL 34119570 (Alaska Super. Ct. Dec. 2002). 
 328.  Id. at *6. 
 329.  Id. 
 330.  Bauer, supra note 14, at 175. 
 331.  ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.545 (2010) (“In interpreting [section 45.50.471 of the 
Alaska Statutes] due consideration and great weight should be given the 
interpretations of 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1) (§ 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act).”). 
 332.  Norton, supra note 114, at 653. 
 333.  Id. at 653–54. 
 334.  See Pauline E. Calande, Note, State Incorporation of Federal Law: A 
Response to the Demise of Implied Federal Rights of Action, 94 YALE L. J. 1144, 1148–
49 (1985). 
 335.  ASRC Energy Servs. Power and Commc’ns, LLC v. Golden Valley Elec. 
Ass’n, Inc., No. S-12630, No. 6617, No. S-12989, 2011 Alas. LEXIS 118, at *28–30 
(Alaska Nov. 4, 2011). 
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practice.336 Those changes restricted the scope of what constitutes an 
unfair act or practice, resulting in a conflict with the current Alaska 
standard.337 In maintaining its standard, the Alaska Supreme Court 
stated: “to provide broad protection to consumers and business people 
in Alaska and to achieve the uniformity that was the goal of the 1974 
legislature, we will adhere to our precedent standards for unfairness 
and deception until such time that the legislature sees fit to incorporate the 
limitations of 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) into Alaska’s [UTPCPA].”338 
Some commentators have argued that making FTC Act provisions 
mandatory authority in state courts is a poor idea; incorporation would 
rob state court judges of flexibility in dealing with actions that might be 
unique to their state.339 Others argue that the FTC Act is a poor model 
for states to follow, since the adjudication process at the agency is 
completely removed from state law issues and also vulnerable to 
political pressures, funding crunches, and firm requirements of broad 
public interest.340 All CPAs by design look to the FTC because as the 
supreme consumer protection agency, the FTC will by default have the 
primary policymaking role in the field and will also define the 
continually evolving standard of what is unfair and deceptive.341 The 
Alaska Legislature’s easiest move would be to incorporate the FTC Act 
and allow the UTPCPA to become the “Little FTC Act” it was designed 
to be. A more difficult solution would be to create some artificial 
statutory substitute for the discretion that the FTC carefully employs.342 
Regardless, something must be done to give defendants notice of the 
law and to prevent consumer actions from deterring otherwise lawful, 
even desirable, conduct. 
CONCLUSION 
Application of the Alaska UTPCPA by Alaska state courts is 
currently falling short of the legislative mandate to protect Alaska 
citizens from unfair and deceptive actions. Adherence to attorneys’ fees 
awards to all prevailing plaintiffs, treble damages provisions, and 
encouragement of business versus business and now even business 
versus consumer actions discourages legitimate suits, incentivizes “pile-
on” suits, and suppresses otherwise desirable conduct. In order to best 
 
 336.  15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2006). 
 337.  ASRC, 2011 Alas. LEXIS 118, at *29. 
 338.  Id. at *29–30 (emphasis added). 
 339.  Mize, supra note 47, at 668–69. 
 340.  Id. at 666–67; see also Sovern, supra note 25, at 452. 
 341.  Schwartz, Silverman & Appel, supra note 128, at 99. 
 342.  Sovern, supra note 25, at 462. 
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serve not only the citizens and consumers of Alaska, but also small 
businesses struggling in the worst economic climate in decades, the 
Alaska Legislature should take the initiative to revise the Act. By 
defining terms, making the federal FTC Act mandatory, and considering 
revising the balance between attorneys’ fees and burdens of proof, the 
legislature can send a clear message that deceptive trade practices will 
not be tolerated, but they will be fairly and evenly adjudicated in Alaska 
state courts. 
 
